Top Management Team Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality by Zhang, Dan
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Dan Zhang, 2017 
TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM CHARACTERISTICS AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to 
 
The Faculty of the C.T. Bauer College of Business 
 
University of Houston 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Dan Zhang 
 
June, 2017 
TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM CHARACTERISTICS AND  
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 
 
          
_________________________ 
                                                                                              Dan Zhang 
 
 
                                                                                             APPROVED: 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
            Gerald J. Lobo 
                                                                                                      Professor of Accounting 
 Chairperson of Committee 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Janet A. Meade  
Professor of Accounting 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
C. Chet Miller 
Professor of Management 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Amy X. Sun  
Associate Professor of Accounting 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Latha Ramchand, Dean 
C. T. Bauer College of Business 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Department of Accountancy and 
Taxation of the C. T. Bauer College of Business for their help and guidance throughout 
my Ph.D. study. In particular, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the 
members of my dissertation committee, Professor Gerald J. Lobo (Chair), Janet Meade, 
Chet Miller, and Amy Sun, whose comments and suggestions have greatly improved the 
dissertation. 
I would like to thank Chunxiao Xue, Lin Yi, Hyunkwon Cho, Lin Wang, Lanyi 
Zhang, Yue Qiu, and all other graduate students at University of Houston, who have 
made my doctoral study much more enjoyable. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Liwu Zhang and Jing Fu, and my 
husband, Ming Gu, for their endless love, constant support, and cheerful encouragement 
throughout my life.
 
 
TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM CHARACTERISTICS AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Abstract of a Dissertation 
 
Presented to 
 
The Faculty of the C. T. Bauer College of Business 
 
University of Houston 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Dan Zhang 
 
June, 2017
 
 
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The accounting literature often views managers as individuals whose financial 
reporting decisions are determined by their economic incentives and individual 
characteristics. However, managers typically work in a team and most decisions have 
at least some input from other members of the team. This study examines the impact 
of top management team (TMT) characteristics on financial reporting quality, as 
proxied by accounting restatements and both accrual and real earnings management. The 
results indicate that firms with TMTs that have more similar backgrounds and longer 
experience working together are more likely to misreport their financial statements. 
Additional tests document that these firms also engage in more accrual and real earnings 
management when they face income-increasing earnings management incentives. 
Moreover, the impact of TMTs on financial reporting quality varies with board 
composition. TMT shared experience and homogeneity are more positively related 
to restatements for firms with lower percentage of independent directors and longer-
tenured  audit committee members. These findings indicate that top management team 
characteristics are important determinants of firms’ financial reporting quality. 
  
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2  RELATED LITERATURE ......................................................................... 6 
2.1 Managers’ Impact on Financial Reporting Quality .......................................... 6 
2.2 Organization Research and Top Management Team Characteristics ............... 9 
2.3 Top Management Team and Financial Reporting Decisions .......................... 10 
CHAPTER 3  DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES ..................................................... 15 
3.1 Team Homogeneity ......................................................................................... 16 
3.2 Shared Team Experiences ............................................................................... 18 
CHAPTER 4  RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................... 23 
4.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................. 23 
4.2 Empirical Measures ........................................................................................ 25 
4.3 Regression Model ........................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................................... 33 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis ............................................... 33 
5.2 Multivariate Results ........................................................................................ 34 
CHAPTER 6  ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 36 
6.1 Board Characteristics ...................................................................................... 36 
6.2 Positions of Top Executives............................................................................ 39 
6.3 Endogenous Hiring Decisions and CEO Power ............................................. 40 
6.4 Separate Analyses of Homogeneity Attributes ............................................... 42 
6.5 Faultlines ......................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
vii 
 
6.6 Accrual and Real Earnings Management ........................................................ 47 
CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ................................................... 50 
APPENDIX   VARIABLE DEFINITIONS ...................................................................... 53 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 57 
 
  
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 Top Management Team Positions……………………………………….64  
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1 Distribution of the Sample……….…………………………………… 65 
TABLE 2 Top Management Team Characteristics……....………………………. 66 
TABLE 3 Restatement Frequency…………..…………………………………… 68 
TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics……………..…………………………………… 69 
TABLE 5 Univariate Analysis…………………………………………………… 70 
TABLE 6 Restatements and Top Management Team Characteristics…...……… 72 
TABLE 7 Board Characteristics……...……..…………………………………… 74 
TABLE 8 Top Managers with Different Positions……………………………… 76 
TABLE 9 Endogenous Hiring Decisions and CEO Power……………………… 77 
TABLE 10 Separate Analyses of Homogeneity Attributes.……………………… 78 
TABLE 11 Faultline Strength………………..…………………………………… 79 
TABLE 12 Earnings Management and Top Management Team Characteristics… 80 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When assessing the role of managers on firms’ financial reporting quality, the 
accounting literature usually focuses on the CEO or CFO. Several studies have 
examined how economic incentives faced by CEOs and CFOs, including both explicit 
(compensation) and implicit (reputation and career concerns) incentives, affect firms’ 
reporting choices (Ali and Zhang 2015; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010; McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver 
2008; Pourciau 1993). However, managers may not always make economically 
rational decisions because they possess limited information and must act in the social 
context within the firm (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). Each 
manager works with other members of the team and few, if any, decisions are made by 
only one individual. In addition to the economic incentives faced by each individual 
manager, the characteristics of the top management team (TMT), which shape the firms’ 
internal environment and decision-making process, may also have implications for firms’ 
financial reporting choices. This study examines how TMT characteristics relate to 
firms’ financial reporting quality, with a focus on the conformity with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), or in other words, the accuracy of the financial 
statements.  
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Upper echelon theory, developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984), views the 
organization as a reflection of its top managers. Top executives’ cognitions, values, 
and perceptions are believed to have significant influence on the firm (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, and Sanders 2004). Organization researchers use observable 
characteristics of managers such as tenure, education, and functional background as 
proxies for the unobservable psychological constructs that shape managers’ 
interpretations and reactions to different situations. Numerous empirical studies 
demonstrate the impact of these observable TMT characteristics on firm performance 
and strategic choices such as innovation, international diversification, and response to 
competitors’ initiatives (Simons, Pelled, and Smith 1999; West and Anderson 1996; 
Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, and Dalton 2000; Hambrick, Cho, and Chen 1996). 
Although widely studied in the management, psychology, and economics 
literatures, TMT characteristics have been overlooked in the accounting literature. 
Recently, a few studies have linked the demographics of the manager, such as age, 
gender, and religion, with firms’ financial reporting quality (Barua, Davidson, Rama, 
and Thiruvadi 2010; Francis, Hasan, Park, and Wu 2014; Huang, Rose-Green, and 
Lee 2012; McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 2012). However, most of these studies only 
examine the characteristics of a single important individual, either the CEO or the CFO, 
and overlook team related issues. This approach differs from that of management 
researchers who believe “the characteristics and functioning of the top management 
team have far greater potential for predicting organizational outcomes than do the 
characteristics of the CEO” (Hambrick et al. 1996). This study attempts to fill this void 
in the accounting literature by examining the role of TMT in firms’ accounting practices. 
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I focus on two central constructs in the literature on TMT, team homogeneity 
and shared working experience. Homogeneous TMTs have similar perspectives and 
preferences, reinforcing consensus and conformity within the team (O’Reilly, Caldwell, 
and Barnett 1989; Priem 1990). Longer shared working experience enhances social 
integration and communication (Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O’Bannon, and Scully 1994). 
Similar backgrounds and longer shared experience are likely to foster groupthink, 
which is defined as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply 
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members striving for unanimity override 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis 1972). 
Groupthink may prevent managers from discovering errors or irregularities in financial 
statements. What’s worse, high social integration may foster collusion in earnings 
management and even fraud. 
I define TMT as all the managers disclosed as executive officers in the 10-K. I 
hand collect the information on managers of S&P 500 firms (excluding firms in the 
financial and regulated industries) from BoardEx, as well as 10-Ks, proxy statements, 
and company websites. I construct a composite measure of TMT homogeneity using the 
managers’ education level, functional background, and time of entry. I measure shared 
working experience using the averaged pair-wise overlap in the number of years that 
the managers have worked in the TMT. I use restatements collected from 
AuditAnalytics to measure firms’ financial reporting quality. If  a  given  year’s  
financial  reports,  including  both  10-Q  and  10-K,  are misreported and subsequently 
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restated due to accounting errors, I consider financial reporting quality to be low for 
that firm-year. 
1
 
Using a sample of 2,658 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2013, I find that 
TMTs with homogeneous background and long shared experience are more likely to 
misstate their financial reports. Additional tests show that the results are mainly driven 
by more severe restatements with SEC (Board) investigations or class action lawsuits, 
restatements that affect the bottom line earnings or stockholders’ equity, and 
restatements with negative announcement stock returns. In addition, these TMTs also 
report higher abnormal accruals, higher abnormal production costs, and lower abnormal 
discretionary expenditures when facing income-increasing earnings management 
incentives. Overall, the results indicate that TMT homogeneity and shared working 
experience are important determinants of firms’ financial reporting quality. 
I also examine cross-sectional variations with respect to board characteristics. 
More independent directors alleviate the adverse impact of having TMTs with similar 
background and long shared experience, while long-tenured audit committees 
exacerbate the adverse impact. Possible explanations for the results are that 
independent board members introduce new perspectives which alleviate groupthink 
and collusion, while long-tenured audit committees reduce the monitoring effectiveness 
as committee members become “friends” of the managers over time. 
                                                          
1 There may be firms with misstated financial statements that are not discovered yet. However, it is 
difficult to identify those firms. As a result, I use the misstatements that have been discovered and 
corrected, i.e. restatements, to measure financial reporting quality. I use the terms “misstatements” and 
“restatements” interchangeably in the rest of the dissertation. 
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the 
literature on the determinants of financial reporting quality by identifying two 
important factors, TMT homogeneity and shared working experience, that have 
implications for financial reporting quality. It shows that managers’ reporting 
decisions are affected not only by the economic incentives that have been widely 
documented in the prior literature, but also by managers’ backgrounds which shape 
their values and perceptions, and hence their judgments and actions. Second, this 
study introduces new perspectives in the accounting research on managerial impact. It 
shows that team dynamics may have significant impact on managerial decisions. 
Focusing only on the individual effect of the CEO or the CFO depicts an incomplete 
picture of the functioning of managers within the firm. Exploring the impact of 
interactions and group processes within the management team or other teams such as 
the board can be a fruitful research area of research in accounting. Finally, this study 
contributes to the literature on corporate governance by documenting the financial 
reporting consequence when boards with different compositions interact with TMTs. 
The findings are relevant for investors and corporate governance researchers when 
considering the impact of the boards and management teams. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. I review the 
literature in Chapter 2, develop the hypotheses in Chapter 3, present the sample 
selection and research design in Chapter 4, report the results in Chapter 5, discuss 
several additional tests in Chapter 6, and conclude the study in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 In this chapter, I review the related literature. Section 2.1 discusses the accounting 
literature about the managers’ impact on firms’ financial reporting quality. Section 2.2 
introduces the management literature on top management teams. Section 2.3 talks about 
several recent studies that shed some light on the relation between top management teams 
and financial reporting quality.  
 
2.1 Managers’ Impact on Financial Reporting Quality 
There is voluminous research about managers’ impact on firms’ financial 
reporting quality. Most studies focus on the effect of economic incentives faced by 
managers. Prior literature documents significant relations between different 
measures of financial reporting quality and earnings-based compensation such as 
bonus plans and equity-based compensation such as stock options (Healy 1985; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Baker, Collins, and Reitenga 2003; Armstrong, 
Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010). In addition to these explicit economic incentives, 
researchers also document the impact of implicit economic incentives such as career 
concerns. For example, Ali and Zhang (2015) find that new CEOs try to favorably 
influence the market’s perception of their ability and tend to report higher discretionary 
accruals. 
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Apart from economic incentives, recent accounting studies have started to 
explore the impact of demographic characteristics of individual managers. Instead of 
treating decision making as a fully rational process of finding the optimal choice, 
bounded rationality, proposed by Simon (1957), views decision making as a search 
process of seeking a satisfactory solution given the information and cognitive 
limitations of the decision maker (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). Under bounded 
rationality, there is a role for managerial characteristics such as age, gender, education, 
and working experience in determining organization outcomes, because these 
characteristics may affect the cognitive perceptions, values, and information sets of 
managers and, hence, their decisions. 
Demography theory has significant impact on the study of organizations. 
Pfeffer (1983) suggests that “demography is an important, causal variable that affects 
a number of intervening variables and processes and, through them, a number of 
organizational outcomes”. However, the implication of managerial demographics is 
under-researched in the accounting literature. Several recent accounting papers try to 
link firms’ financial reporting quality with demographic characteristics of the CEO or 
CFO. Using a sample of 359 CFOs who have served at least two companies, Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) find significant CFO fixed effects for several 
accounting choices such as discretionary accruals and earnings smoothness. Other 
studies document a relation between financial reporting quality and observable 
managerial characteristics, including gender and age. Francis et al. (2014) find that 
female CFOs exhibit higher accounting conservatism than male CFOs. Barua et al. 
(2010) show that female CFOs are associated with higher accrual quality. Huang et 
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al. (2012) find that CEO age is negatively associated with just meeting analyst 
forecasts and with financial restatements. McGuire et al. (2012) find that religion 
affects managers’ financial reporting decisions. Although they do not directly measure 
the religious beliefs of managers, they show that firms headquartered in areas with 
strong religious social norms are less likely to engage in financial reporting 
irregularities such as accounting related shareholder lawsuits and accounting 
restatements. 
The literature tends to focus on one important individual, either the CEO or the 
CFO. Part of the reason may be that, following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
CEO and the CFO are required to certify the financial statements and may face 
criminal sentences for falsifying the statements. Thus, the CEO and the CFO are 
viewed as the two individuals who have the most impact on a firm’s financial reports. 
However, the CEO and the CFO do not make decisions by themselves. Instead, they 
cooperate with each other and with other members of the top management team. For 
instance, a  more powerful CEO can pressure the CFO to manipulate financial 
reports (Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin 2011; Friedman 2014). Another emerging 
literature explores the social networks or social ties of the CEO and/or the CFO. It 
documents that when the CEO or the CFO have more social ties with board 
members, they are more likely to manage earnings (Krishnan, Raman, Yang, and Yu 
2011; Hwang and Kim 2012). Although accounting researchers recognize that 
financial reporting decisions are not individual decisions made by the CEO, they 
seldom consider the top management team as the unit of analysis. Little is known 
9 
 
 
 
about how the interplay or the characteristics of the top executives as a team affect 
financial reporting decisions. 
 
2.2 Organization Research and Top Management Team Characteristics 
Behavioral theory of the firm states that managers must act in the social 
context of conflicting goals within their firm (March and Simon 1958). The level of 
analysis in the organizational leadership studies shifted from individual CEOs to the 
entire team of top managers following the introduction of the dominant coalition 
concept by Cyert and March (1963). In large and complex firms, managerial decision 
making is unlikely to be the exclusive domain of a single individual (Drucker 1974). 
Many organization researchers believe that TMTs, the “dominant coalition” of 
individuals responsible for policy making at the firm, have far greater potential for 
predicting organizational outcomes than CEOs alone (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; 
Hambrick et al. 1996). 
The seminal work by Hambrick and Mason (1984) combines the dominant 
coalition concept and demography theory to develop upper echelon theory, which 
“views an organization as a reflection of its top managers and centers on the influence 
of executive cognitions, values, and perceptions on the process of strategic choice and 
resultant performance outcomes” (Carpenter et al. 2004). Due to the difficulties in 
measuring the psychological constructs, Hambrick and Mason suggest using 
observable managerial characteristics as proxies. Upper echelon theory has received 
much attention and inspired organization researchers to conduct many studies about the 
impact of TMT characteristics. Empirical evidence suggests that TMT characteristics 
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consistently predict organizational outcomes better than do CEO characteristics 
(Hambrick 1994). 
This rich literature documents that the central tendency of TMT traits, such as 
age, tenure, education, and functional background, and the homogeneity in these 
traits significantly affect organization performance and strategies (see the reviews by 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella 2009 and Carpenter et al. 2004). The variables 
of interest in my study, team tenure and team homogeneity are two central 
constructs examined in the literature. This literature finds that firms with longer team 
tenure are less innovative and follow more persistent strategies that conform to the 
industry norm (Bantel and Jackson 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Kor 2006), 
whereas firms with heterogeneous teams are more innovative, more likely to take 
competitive actions, and are associated with greater levels of international operations 
(Bantel and Jackson 1989; Hambrick et al 1996; Carpenter and Fredrickson 2001; 
Tihanyi et al. 2000). The effect of team tenure and team homogeneity on a  firm’s 
overall performance is mixed, with the relation depending on group processes and 
the external environment (Smith et al. 1994; Keck 1997; Carpenter 2002; Kilduff, 
Angelmar, and Mehra 2000) 
 
2.3 Top Management Team and Financial Reporting Decisions 
The above evidence in the management literature suggests a strong link 
between TMT characteristics and organizational decisions. Therefore, although the 
CEO and CFO may have the most significant impact, other members of the TMT 
may also play an important role in firms’ financial reporting decisions. Moreover, 
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even though the CEO and CFO may have the final say, their personal actions could 
be affected not only by their individual characteristics but also by the social 
context within which they make the decision. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) 
develop a model of internal governance of firms in which the actions of firms’ CEOs 
are limited by their subordinates in addition to the external governance by investors. 
Because CEOs need to motivate effort from subordinate managers, the CEO’s action 
will be affected by the preferences and goals of the other top executives. 
Two recent papers are closely related to my study. Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin 
(2016) examine the relation between internal governance and real earnings 
management. They find that firms engage in less real earnings management when 
key subordinate executives have longer horizon measured by the number of years to 
retirement age, and stronger relative influence in the firm measured by their 
compensation relative to the CEO’s. While Cheng et al. (2016) examine how internal 
governance affects firms’ myopic operating decisions such as overproduction and 
reduction in discretionary expenditure, my study focuses more on accounting issues 
such as GAAP violations. In addition, Cheng et al. (2016) study whether the 
subordinate executives’ incentives (measured by their horizon) and ability (measured 
by their relative power at the firm) to monitor the CEO have implications for the 
effectiveness of the internal governance. My study, in contrast, explores how the social 
environment within the management team, measured by the length of time working 
together and background similarity, affects managers’ behavior. 
Another paper by Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) examines how social 
connectedness between the CEO and other top managers and directors affects 
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corporate fraud. They find that appointment-based CEO connectedness measured by 
the percentage of top five executives hired or promoted during the CEO’s tenure is 
positively associated with corporate fraud, while prior network connections based on 
past employment, education, or social organization memberships do not have a 
significant impact on fraud. Khanna et al. (2015) argue that a CEO’s “soft” influence is 
strengthened by his internal connections. Other top executives or directors are more 
likely to coordinate with the CEO and are less willing to “blow the whistle” if they are 
hired or promoted by the CEO. In contrast, prior network ties are associated with a 
weaker sense of loyalty and hence will not facilitate wrongdoings of the CEO. 
My findings differ from those in Khanna et al. (2015). Homogeneity in 
past education and working experiences of the top managers is positively associated 
with accounting-related restatements and accrual and real earnings management. The 
different results may be driven by the following two reasons. First, the two papers 
measure different aspects of team diversity. According to Harrison and Klein (2007), 
variety and separation are two distinctive types of diversity. Variety refers to differences 
in “kind, source, or category of relevant knowledge or experience among team members” 
while separation speaks more to “disagreement or opposition in positions or opinions” 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). My paper assesses the diversity of TMTs in terms of the 
variety of education, career tracks, and time of entry into the firm, while Khanna et al. 
(2015) examines the interpersonal connection within the TMT using affiliations with the 
same school, firm, or social organizations, which fits more into the concept of separation. 
Second, Khanna et al. (2015) examine corporate fraud which include severe 
intentional accounting manipulations and non-accounting fraud involving 
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misappropriation of firm assets. My paper studies the impact on firms’ overall 
financial reporting quality. Fraud cases are rare, occurring only 10 times (0.4%) in my 
sample of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2013. As a result, I do not restrict my analysis to 
these most extreme cases. I examine all the accounting related restatements which 
may or may not be alleged as fraud as well as accrual and real earnings management. 
Although similarities in past education and working experiences may not create strong 
loyalty to the CEO that facilitates severe wrongdoings such as fraud, they may foster 
groupthink that increases unintentional accounting errors and strengthen coordination 
and trust that facilitate collusion in intentional earnings management.  
Another important distinction between my study and the previous two studies 
examining the impact of internal governance (Cheng et al. 2016; Khanna et al. 2015) 
is that they focus on the monitoring of subordinate executives for the CEO. The 
theoretical arguments and empirical measures essentially assume a top-down 
approach to decision-making within the firm, i.e.,  the  CEO  makes  the  decision  and  
the  subordinate  executives  respond  to  that  decision. However, financial reporting 
decisions do not necessarily follow a top-down process. A bottom-up process may 
also exist. For example, divisional CEOs or CFOs may be involved in unintentional 
accounting errors or intentional earnings management, which affects the quality of 
financial statements; CEO and CFO as well as other members in the corporate 
accounting department may monitor the behavior of divisional managers. As a result, I 
do not consider the CEO as the center of analysis but assume that each member of 
the TMT cross monitors the others and use the entire TMT as the unit of analysis. 
The literature review suggests that viewing firms’ financial reporting 
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outcome as a team decision rather than a decision made by a key individual may 
depict a more complete picture of the functioning of managers and help us gain 
additional insight into the determinants of firms’ financial reporting quality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
The quality of firms’ financial statements is affected by the quality of data 
reported by each division or unit within the firm and the decisions made by the 
corporate accounting department when consolidating the accounting data (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999; Kothari 2001). Figure 1 depicts how top managers relate to the financial 
reporting process. Each divisional head reports the financial data of the business unit, 
region, or function to the corporate accounting department. The controller and 
treasurer create the consolidated report, which combines the information from each 
unit and incorporates necessary estimations from the tax director about tax-related 
accruals and from the general counsel about legal and other contingent liabilities, 
subject to the monitoring of the internal auditor. The consolidated financial statement 
is reported to the CFO and CEO who may decide to adjust the reported accounting 
numbers. Unintentional and intentional errors may occur at every level of the financial 
reporting process. Each top executive directly involved in the financial  reporting  
process  may  cross  monitor  the  others  for  unintentional  and  intentional reporting 
errors. 
Other top executives such as the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Strategy 
Officer, and Chief Technology Officer, who are less closely related to the financial 
reporting process, may also help monitor this process as they may obtain information 
16 
 
 
 
from colleagues through informal communications. In addition, they may affect the 
behavior of executives closely involved in the financial reporting process indirectly 
through their impact on the organizational culture and social environment within the 
TMT. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
 
Team homogeneity and shared working experience may affect the social 
practices and working processes within the TMT (Carroll and Harrison 1998), which 
likely have an impact on the internal checks and balances and the monitoring 
effectiveness for both unintentional and intentional errors in the financial reporting 
process. 
 
3.1 Team Homogeneity 
TMT background distribution is considered a strong determinant for 
interpersonal attraction, cognitive diversity, and social interactions within the firm 
(Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper, Julin, and Peyronnin 1991). Studies on work group 
diversity describe two main processes through which diversity may affect team 
performance. From the information/decision-making perspective, differences in 
information, knowledge, and preferences of team members may induce more complete 
information use in team decisions (Knippenberg and Shippers 2007). Diverse teams are 
related to more thorough environmental scanning and information processing, and 
better problem-solving skills (Keck 1997; Bantel and Jackson 1989; Hoffman and 
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Maier 1961). In addition, divergent views may also stimulate task conflicts and careful 
consideration of the functioning of the team, so the team is less likely to move to 
premature consensus and can quickly learn from past experiences and take corrective 
actions (Schippers, Den Hartog, and Koopman 2007; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1999). 
As a result, having a homogeneous TMT may be detrimental to reporting quality 
especially in today’s complex and fast-changing business environment. The narrow 
views may prevent the managers from making appropriate accounting estimates and 
developing an effective internal control system that ensures proper gathering, 
processing, and synthesis of accounting data. 
Another perspective relies on the social categorization process or similarity 
attraction theory (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998), which argues that differences among 
people will elicit classification of others as either similar or dissimilar and formation of 
subgroups. Background similarity promotes cohesion, social integration, and consensus 
in a group (Lott and Lott 1965; O’Reilly et al. 1989; Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, Sims, 
Smith, and Flood 1999; Priem 1990). As a result, a  homogenous TMT provides more 
opportunity for collusion in intentional earnings management and even fraud. In 
addition, members in a homogeneous TMT may have stronger desire to maintain good 
relations and higher pressure to conform to group goals and norms (Daboub, Rasheed, 
Priem, and Gray 1995; O’Reilly et al. 1989; Hackman 1976). Lower resistance from 
other managers for the earnings management behavior may also facilitate the 
rationalization of such behavior. 
Although the above arguments predict a negative relation, there are some 
arguments that suggest a positive relation between financial reporting quality and 
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team homogeneity. Homogeneous teams are easier to coordinate as team members may 
hold similar views that are easier to reconcile (Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly 1984; 
Hambrick and Mason 1984; Keck 1997). Homogeneity may reduce team conflicts, 
enhance within-group communications, and reduce political activities or power 
struggles (Pfeffer 1983; Wagner et al. 1984; Zenger and Lawrence 1989). These 
factors may improve team efficiencies (Hambrick et al. 1996). In addition, less 
political activity and power struggle may reduce the pressure for team members to 
deliver good performance. Team homogeneity is negatively related to turnover rate of 
managers (Jackson et al. 1991; Wiersema and Bird 1993). The reduced pressure and 
career concerns may decrease the incentives for individuals such as the CEO, CFO, 
or divisional heads to manipulate accounting results. These arguments suggest a 
positive relation between team homogeneity and financial reporting quality. The 
above discussion suggests that how TMT homogeneity will affect financial reporting 
quality is unclear ex ante, so I state my first hypothesis in the null form. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Financial reporting quality is not associated with homogeneity  
of the top management team.  
 
3.2 Shared Team Experiences 
While background homogeneity represents the cultural match among the top 
executives when they first enter the team, shared working experience represents the 
gradual enculturation of top executives over their service in the team. Teams that 
have worked together for a long time tend to develop similar thinking and 
behaving styles (Pfeffer 1983; Tihanyi et al. 2000; Harrison, Price, and Bell 1998). 
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Such teams are more likely to fall into the trap of groupthink (Janis 1972). Teams 
suffering from groupthink show symptoms including belief in the correctness of their 
own group, rationalization of their behaviors, failure to initiate or maintain contact 
with opposing groups, lack of cooperation with a third party mediator, incomplete 
information search, and selective information processing (Tetlock 1979; Tetlock, 
Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld 1992; Hensley and Griffin 1986; Esser 1998; 
Turner and Pratkanis 1998). Groupthink may reduce the incentives for the top 
executives directly involved in the financial reporting process to check others’ work and 
prevent them from being critical when judging others’ work. Moreover, tones from the 
top may affect the organization culture and control environment within the firm and 
the behavior of lower-tier personnel in the financial reporting process. As a result, 
there is higher risk of unintentional accounting error or misinterpretation of GAAP. 
In addition, communications and work processes tend to become more routine and 
less flexible after an extended time of shared experience (Keck 1997; Katz 1982). There 
could be lower recognition of the need to scan the environment, communicate with 
outsiders such as auditors, and change behaviors. TMTs may become less timely in 
adjusting accounting estimations such as goodwill impairment and bad-debt provisions. 
In addition, routine interactions and processes may reduce the awareness of internal 
control weaknesses or inappropriate accounting treatments.   
Longer shared experience may also foster collusion in intentional earnings 
management.
 
Intentionally managing the accounting numbers is a risky behavior 
which could result in reputation loss or even criminal sentences if the misconduct is 
discovered later. Engaging in such risky activities requires trust and coordination 
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among the managers, which is unlikely to develop in a new team (Kor 2006). 
Moreover, although not every member in the team would actively participate in such 
behavior, longer working relationships could increase passive acquiescence, meaning 
that members are aware of the improper behavior but are unwilling to take 
corrective actions (Daboub et al. 1995). Long tenure is shown to limit cognitive 
conflicts and debates and increase the commitment to the status quo and conformity to 
the group (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991). Managers 
on a team with longer shared experience may remain silent even if they discover or 
hear about earnings management activities. In addition, negative consequences of 
discovered improper financial reporting behavior such as demotion or turnover may 
be less likely if the top executives are more socially integrated and develop personal 
friendships. These factors may work together, which will result in more intentional 
earnings management activities
2
 for TMTs with long shared working experiences. 
Similar to the case of team homogeneity, there also exist some counter 
arguments for shared working experience. First, it takes time for members in a team 
to learn how to work with each other. Gabarro (1987) suggests that new teams may 
take up to six months to become productive and productivity increases as team 
members understand the job well and learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses 
through interactions over time. As a result, a TMT with longer shared experience may 
be more competent and efficient because its members are more familiar with the 
                                                          
2 Intentional earnings management does not necessarily constitute fraud. Accrual estimations often 
involve judgements from the managers. “Cookie jar” reserves from bad debt expenses or “big bath” 
activity from impairment losses may not result in fraud allegations, depending on the magnitude and 
materiality of the earnings management amount. The argument in this study speaks to earnings 
management in general which may include less severe earnings management activities and more severe 
ones that may be considered as fraud. 
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firm and each other. In addition, increased tenure is associated with less conflict 
and more communication among the group members and more powerful status, 
which may reduce their incentives to manage earnings (Keck 1997; Smith et al., 1994). 
These factors suggest a positive relation between shared team experience and 
reporting quality. Since the relation is not very obvious ex ante, this question can 
only be answered empirically. I state my second hypothesis in the null form. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Financial reporting quality is not associated with the shared working  
experience of the top management team. 
 
In this study, I view homogeneity and shared team experience as two 
distinctive aspects of the TMT. Team homogeneity captures the similarity in personal 
backgrounds and experiences of the top managers, independent of the team. Shared 
team experience refers to the common historical working experiences of the top 
managers within the team. It is possible that shared team experience and team 
homogeneity are related. Team homogeneity may be positively associated with shared 
team experience as managers keep similar members and remove dissimilar ones 
from the team over time. According to similarity attraction theory, people are 
attracted to others who are similar to themselves (Byrne 1971). Managers in an 
organization may recruit and promote people who share similar backgrounds and 
attitudes with them, a tendency referred to as homosocial reproduction (Moore 1962). 
If this is the case, longer shared experience would increase homogeneity within the 
TMT. In my sample, I find a negative correlation (-0.13) between the two variables, 
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so I treat shared team experience and team homogeneity as two distinctive dimensions 
in my analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss the research design used in the study. Section 4.1 
presents the sample selection process. Section 4.2 introduces the empirical measures used 
for financial reporting quality and TMT characteristics. Section 4.3 shows the regression 
model used to analyze the relation between financial reporting quality and TMT 
characteristics. 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
I focus on S&P 500 firms because they are large public companies unlikely to be 
controlled by any single individual such as the CEO or CFO and the TMT may play a 
more important role. I start with all S&P 500 firms at the end of 2013, excluding 
financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated industries (SIC 4400-4999). I 
collect information of these firms for all available years from 2006 to 2013. I do not 
require the firm to exist for the entire sample period, but I delete firms with less than 
three years of available financial data. The final sample includes 2,658 firm-year 
observations for 336 firms. Please see Table 1 for the sample selection process and 
distribution of observations by industry and year. The sample is evenly distributed 
over the years. However, it is not evenly distributed across industries, with 
manufacturing firms representing over half of the sample. 
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[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
I define the TMT as all the managers listed as executive officers in the 
firm’s 10-K. All public companies are required to disclose biographical information 
about their executive officers in Part III of form 10-K according to item 401 of 
regulation S-K. Executive officers
3 
are defined as a company’s president, vice 
president in charge of a principal business unit, division or function, and any other 
officer who performs a policy-making function according to Rule 3b-7 of the Exchange 
Act. 
I hand collect the information about each manager’s past education and working 
experiences from the disclosed biographical information in the 10-K, proxy 
statement, company website, and BoardEx. In my sample, over 90% of the firms 
have between 5 and 16 executive officers, with the median being 9. Table 2 reports 
the descriptive statistics for the collected information related to the TMT. Panel A of 
Table 2 shows the frequency of disclosed executive titles. The executives that are 
usually disclosed in the 10-K include CEO, CFO, General Counsel, Divisional Head, 
VP-Human Resource, Controller, and COO. Panels B, C, and D of Table 2 report the 
distribution of managers based on the highest degree obtained, past career tracks, and 
                                                          
3 An executive officer differs from a  named executive officer, whose compensation is required to be 
disclosed in the proxy statement under item 402 of Regulation S-K. Named executive officers 
include the CEO, CFO, and three other most highly compensated individuals. I do not use this 
definition for the top management team because the five highest compensated individuals may 
include individuals who have left the firm in the current year. Moreover, this definition often 
excludes officers such as the controller, treasurer, and divisional head, who are closely related to the 
financial reporting function but do not receive very high compensation. 
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years of service with the firm, respectively. The highest education for most of the 
managers is the bachelor’s degree (38%) or Master’s degree (42%). The most 
common past career tracks are finance and accounting (26%) and general management 
(23%). The majority of managers have worked with the firm for less than 10 years (43%) 
or between 11 to 20 years (27%). 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
4.2 Empirical Measures 
Financial reporting quality may contain different dimensions. According to the 
conceptual framework, qualitative characteristics of decision-useful information include 
relevance, faithful representation, comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2010). Since FASB considers 
these dimensions when setting the standards, violations of GAAP represent deviations 
from the balanced criteria set by the standard setters. I use restatements, collected from 
the non-reliance restatement database in AuditAnalytics, as a proxy for overall 
financial reporting quality because restatements unambiguously reflect violations of 
GAAP and are not affected by specification and measurement errors of discretionary 
accrual models (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). I create an indicator variable 
Restate, which equals one if the firm’s 10-Q or 10-K during a fiscal year is 
misreported and subsequently restated due to accounting errors, and zero otherwise. 
Restatements are collected from AuditAnalytics on December 31, 2016, so I allow at 
least three years for the misstatement to be discovered. 
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It is difficult to distinguish unintentional errors from intentional errors when 
using restatements. However, this disadvantage does not prevent the use of 
restatements as a measure of overall reporting quality because even though a 
misstatement is unintentional, the error may reflect poor internal control systems
4
 
governing the firms’ financial reporting processes, which may result from insufficient 
managerial effort or ability. Nevertheless, to shed some light on the type of errors that 
the TMT characteristics affect, I classify restatements into different categories. First, a 
restatement is classified as an irregularity (Restate_Irr) if it is identified as fraud in 
AuditAnalytics or results in SEC (board) investigation or class action lawsuits, and 
classified as an error (Restate_NonIrr) otherwise. The second criterion is whether the 
restatement affects the bottom line earnings or equity. A restatement is classified as 
Restate_BL if it leads to changes in net income or shareholders’ equity, and classified 
as Restate_NonBL otherwise. The third criterion is based on the restatement 
announcement stock return.  A restatement is classified as Restate_Negret if the seven-
day (-1, 5) cumulative abnormal return
5
 is negative around the restatement 
announcement date, and classified as Restate_Posret otherwise. 
 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for restatements. Panel A of Table 3 shows 
the distribution of the 336 sample firms by the number of restatements (or restated 
                                                          
4 
Disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control is rare for S&P 500 firms. I observe only 35 cases of 
Section 302 and Section 404 internal control weaknesses in my sample. Given the small number of internal 
control weaknesses in my sample,  I do not report tests on internal control weakness. Using an indicator 
variable for reporting internal control weakness (ICW) as the dependent variable, untabulated results show 
that TMT homogeneity and shared experience are both positively related to ICW (significant at less than 1% 
and 10%, respectively).  
5 Results are qualitatively similar if a three-day (-1, 1) or five-day (-2, 2) window is used to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return. 
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years). 212 (63%) firms do not have restatements during the sample period, 78 (23%) 
firms have one restatement, and 46 (14%) firms have more than one restatement. In 
terms of the number of years affected by those restatements, 50 (15%) firms have 
only one restated year, while 74 (22%) firms have more than one restated year. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the distribution of restatements by the primary reason 
for the restatement. There are a total of 193 restatements covering 352 firm-years 
for the sample firms from 2006 to 2013. Errors in the cash flow statement and tax-
related accruals are most frequent with each representing one fifth of all restatements. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the frequency of restatement by year. There is an 
increasing trend of restatements for the sample firms, with restatement frequency 
increasing from 7% in 2006 to 16% in 2013. However, the increase is mainly 
driven by less severe misstatements. Reporting irregularity (Restate_Irr) is relatively 
stable across years at around 2% with the exception of the year 2006 when the 
frequency of irregularity is 4.6%. 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
I follow Carroll and Harrison (1998) and create the variable Team_SharedExp 
using the averaged pair-wise overlap in the tenure of the top managers.
6
  
                                                          
6
 An alternative measure for shared team experience is the average team tenure. However, average team 
tenure is a noisy measure for shared working experience because it is affected by the standard deviation of 
team tenure. For example, an average team tenure of 5 years may result from a team where all members 
work in the team for five years. It may also come from a team where one member works in the team for 0 
years and the other works in the team for 10 years, in which case there are no shared working experiences 
although we observe the average team tenure to be 5 years. As a result, I use overlapping tenure instead of 
average team tenure as the measure for shared experiences. Nevertheless, a robustness check using the 
average team tenure yields qualitatively similar results. 
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Team_SharedExp = 
1
𝑁
∑ min⁡(𝑢𝑖⁡,
⁡
𝑖≠𝑗
⁡𝑢𝑗)       (1) 
Where N is the total number of pairs within the TMT and ui is the tenure of 
manager i in the TMT, defined as the number of years since manager i was promoted to 
the level of Vice President or higher. I use the decile ranking of this variable normalized 
to range between zero and one (Team_SharedExp10) in the regression to facilitate 
interpretation of the coefficients. 
Team_Homo is a composite measure of homogeneity in education level, 
functional background, and firm tenure created to measure overall homogeneity in the 
experiences of the top managers. Education level is classified into high_school, 
undergraduate, master, JD, and PhD based on the highest degree obtained. I do not use 
managers’ major fields of education because information on majors is usually missing in 
BoardEx and one executive can hold several degrees majoring in different subjects. 
Moreover, the functional background can partially capture the education curriculum since 
the career path is usually associated with the education curriculum. Functional 
background is the career track on which the manager spent the most time in the past. It 
includes (1) general management, (2) finance and accounting, (3) marketing, sales and 
public relations, (4) research and engineering, (5) production and operations, (6) law, and 
(7) personnel management (Hambrick et al. 1996). I also include homogeneity in firm 
tenure (or length of service) because similarity in time of entry is related to cultural 
similarity and frequency of communication among group members, which in turn affects 
group integration and cohesiveness (Carroll and Harrison 1998; Wagner et al. 1984). I 
convert firm tenure into a categorical variable using 10-year increments in years of 
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service with the firm.
7
 Managers are classified into five categories, based on years of 
service: (1) less than or equal to 10 years, (2) between 11 to 20 years, (3) between 21 to 
30 years, (4) between 31 to 40 years, and (5) more than 40 years. 
I use three steps to calculate the composite measure Team_Homo. In the first 
step, I calculate the homogeneity in each of the three dimensions, i.e. education level, 
functional background, and firm tenure separately using the Blau (1977) index. 
Homogeneity in education level is calculated using ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion 
of the executives in each of the five degree levels in a given firm year. The highest value 
of one indicates most homogeneous TMTs as all managers have the same degree levels, 
and the lowest value of 0.20 indicates the least homogeneity as when there is an equal 
number of managers in each of the five education levels. Similarly, homogeneity in 
functional background is calculated by summing the squared value of the proportion of 
executives in each of the seven career tracks in a given firm year. Homogeneity in firm 
tenure is calculated by summing the squared value of the proportion of executives in 
each of the five categories of tenure in a given firm year.  
In the second step, I normalize the homogeneity in each of the three dimensions 
to range from 0 to 1. In the third step, I calculate the composite homogeneity measure 
(Team_Homo) by taking the average of the normalized homogeneity measures in the 
three dimensions. I use the decile ranking of Team_Homo, normalized to range between 
0 and 1 (Team_Homo10) in the regression to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients. 
                                                          
7
 In this study, I create a categorical variable using firm tenure. This approach allows me to use the same 
measure, i.e. the Blau (1977) index to calculate homogeneity in the three separate dimensions which makes 
the three homogeneity dimensions more comparable and easier to combine. The standard deviation of firm 
tenure in my sample is about 10 years, so I classify firm tenure based on 10-year increments. In a 
robustness check, I consider firm tenure as a continuous variable and use the negative value of the standard 
deviation in firm tenure as the measure for tenure homogeneity. The results are qualitatively similar using 
this alternative approach.  
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4.3 Regression Model 
I use the logistic model in equation (2) to test H1 and H2. The model relates the 
indicator variable Restate to Team_Homo10 and Team_SharedExp10. The coefficients of 
interest are β1 and β2. I expect that TMT homogeneity and shared experience are 
negatively associated with firms’ financial reporting quality, which implies a positive β1 
and β2.
8
  
 
Restate = β0 + β1 Team_Homo10 + β2 Team_SharedExp10 + β3 Team_Size  
+ Firm Characteristics + Managerial Characteristics  
+ Auditor Characteristics + Corporate Governance +Year FE  
+ Industry FE + ɛ               (2) 
 
The model controls for Team_Size, which is the number of executives included in 
the TMT, as well as a wide variety of control variables for firm, manager, and auditor 
characteristics, and corporate governance structures. Year fixed effects are included in 
the model. Dummies for the two-digit SIC code industries are used to control for time-
invariant industry effects.   
The firm characteristic controls include Size, BTM, Leverage, ROA, Std_Ret and 
Firm_Age. I control for the complexity of the firm using the number of geographic 
segments (Geoseg) and the number of two-digit SIC code industry segments (Sic2seg). 
Since capital market pressure to obtain external debt or equity financing and M&A 
activities could create incentives for aggressive reporting behavior (DeFond and 
                                                          
8
 Reverse causality is unlikely in my research setting. Reverse causality would imply that restatements 
cause higher TMT homogeneity and longer TMT tenure. Restatements are an ex post measure for the 
financial reporting quality of the firm at year t. Since it often takes several years for the accounting 
mistakes to be discovered and restated, at year t, restatements are not yet known or announced. TMT 
characteristics are measured at year t. As a result, it is unlikely that restatement, which is unknown at year t, 
will affect TMT characteristics at year t. 
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Jiambalvo 1991; Richardson, Tuna, and Wu 2002; Beasley 1996), I control for whether 
the firm has net issuance of equity or debt exceeding 10% (Ext_Finance), and whether 
the firm engaged in a merger or acquisition in the current year for which the deal value is 
more than 10% of the beginning of the year total market value (M&A). I also control for 
the level of religious adherence in the county of the firm’s headquarter (Religion), 
because prior studies find that stronger religious social norms are associated with fewer 
financial reporting irregularities (McGuire et al. 2012; Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams 
2012). 
Since prior research documents that CEO or CFO equity compensation incentives, 
gender, tenure, and age are related to restatements or other accounting quality measures 
such as discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Francis et al., 2014; 
Barua et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Ali and Zhang 2015), I include CEO_Incentive, 
CEO_Female, New_CEO, CEO_Tenure, CEO_Age,  CFO_Incentive, CFO_Female,  
New_CFO, CFO_Tenure, and CFO_Age to control for these individual managerial 
characteristics.  
In terms of auditor characteristics, prior research reports that Big 4 auditor, 
auditor tenure, audit or nonaudit fees are associated with earnings quality, although the 
results are mixed (Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 2004; Ferguson, Seow, and Young 2004; 
Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002; Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008; Francis, Maydew, and 
Sparks 1999; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002). In my sample, since less than 1% of 
observations are audited by non-Big 4 auditors, I do not control for auditor size. Instead, I 
include New_Auditor, Auditor_Tenure, Audit_Fee, and Nonaudit_Fee to control for 
differences in auditor characteristics.  
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Corporate governance structure may also affect financial reporting quality, I 
control for institutional ownership (Inst_Per), firms with a CEO who also serves as 
chairman of the board (CEO_Chair)
 9
, percentage of independent directors (Indep_Per), 
and average tenure of audit committee members (AuditComm_Tenure) (Agrawal and 
Chadha 2005; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007; Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007; Beasley 1996). The detailed definitions of these 
control variables are provided in Appendix.  
  
                                                          
9
 Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) use CEO_Chair as a proxy for CEO power or CEO dominance in the 
management team. They document that powerful CEOs may pressure the CFO to engage in accounting 
manipulations. They also use two other measures for CEO power, including CEO pay slice which is the 
CEO’s percentage of aggregate top five executives’ total compensation and an indicator variable for 
whether the CEO is the founder of the firm. Untabulated robustness checks suggest that controlling for the 
other two proxies for CEO power does not affect my results.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss the empirical results. Section 5.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the sample and univariate analysis examining how the frequency of 
restatements varies with TMT characteristics. Section 5.2 reports the results from the 
logistic regression of restatements on TMT homogeneity and shared experience. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 4 presents summary 
statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis and Panel B reports the 
correlations among the main variables. 11% of the firm-year observations are restated 
due to accounting errors. On average, managers have been working together for six 
years with a standard deviation of three years. The mean of the composite team 
homogeneity measure is 0.28. Consistent with the hypotheses, Restate is positively 
correlated with Team_ Homo10 and Team_SharedExp10 (significant at less than 1%).  
 [Insert Table 4 About Here] 
Table 5 shows the frequency of restatements when dividing the sample into 
four subsamples based on the median value of Team_SharedExp and Team_Homo. 
Moving from diverse and short-tenured TMTs to homogeneous and long-tenured 
TMTs, restatement (Restate) increases from 5.75% to 16.39%. If we focus on more 
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severe restatements only, the impact is more prominent. For example, reporting 
irregularity (Restate_Irr) increases from 0.33% for firms with diverse and short-
tenured TMTs to 4.43% for firms with homogeneous and long-tenured TMTs. The 
univariate analysis shows that financial reporting quality decreases with TMT 
homogeneity and shared working experience. 
 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 6 shows the results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT 
homogeneity and shared experience. Column 1 reports the results when all restatements 
are included. TMT homogeneity is positively associated with restatements (significant at 
less than 1%, two-sided), suggesting that similar TMT backgrounds are associated with 
reduced financial reporting quality. TMT shared experience is positively associated with 
restatements (significant at less than 1%, two-sided), indicating a decline in financial 
reporting quality with the length of time the TMTs work together. In terms of the 
economic magnitude of the impact, holding the control variables constant, a move from 
the lowest decile of TMT homogeneity (shared working experience) to the highest decile 
will increase the odds of restatement by 425% (157%).  
Misstatements may be driven by unintentional errors or intentional mistakes. In 
order to differentiate irregularity from error, I separately regress Restate_Irr and 
Restate_NonIrr on TMT characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 report the results of Restate_Irr 
and Restate_NonIrr, respectively. TMT shared experience and homogeneity are 
positively associated with restatements for both reporting irregularity and error. However, 
35 
 
 
 
the effect is much stronger for Restate_Irr compared with Restate_NonIrr. Moving from 
the lowest decile of TMT homogeneity (shared experience) to the highest decile will 
increase the odds of reporting irregularity by 2007% (1651%). In contrast, moving from 
the lowest decile of TMT homogeneity (shared experience) to the highest decile will 
increase the odds of reporting errors by 233% (97%). Columns 4 and 5 show the 
regression results of restatements with different effects on the financial reports. TMT 
shared experience and homogeneity are positively associated with more severe 
restatements which result in changes in the bottom line earnings or shareholders’ equity. 
The impact on mistakes which do not affect net income or equity is much smaller. 
Columns 6 and 7 show the regression results of restatements with different reactions from 
investors. TMT shared experience and homogeneity are more positively associated with 
restatements with negative announcement returns than restatements with positive 
announcement returns.  
 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
Overall, both the univariate and the multivariate analyses provide consistent 
results. TMTs with longer shared experience and more similar backgrounds are related to 
a higher frequency of accounting restatements, especially restatements with more severe 
consequences. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
 In this chapter, I conduct some additional analyses. Section 6.1 examines how the 
effect of TMT characteristics on financial reporting quality differs with board 
compositions. Section 6.2 explores the role of the positions of the top managers. Section 
6.3 addresses the concern for endogenous hiring decision made by the CEO. Section 6.4 
shows the effect of each homogeneity attribute. Section 6.5 examines the impact of 
faultlines, which exist when multiple attributes are aligned in the same way. Finally, 
section 6.6 shows how TMT characteristics affect accrual and real activities management 
when firms face income-increasing earnings management incentives. 
 
6.1 Board Characteristics 
In this section, I examine whether the impact of TMT characteristics on 
restatements varies with board characteristics. In Table 6, the two variables measuring 
board characteristics, i.e. percentage of independent board members and average tenure 
of audit committee members, do not show a significant relationship with restatements. 
This result is consistent with prior empirical evidence, which shows mixed results 
concerning the impact of the board on firms’ financial reporting quality (Beasley 1996; 
Abbott et al. 2004; Larcker et al. 2007; Vafeas 2005). However, the composition of the 
board may affect the relation between TMTs and firms’ financial reporting quality.  
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A higher proportion of independent directors may reduce the misreporting of 
TMTs with homogeneous background and long shared working experience. Independent 
directors bring in new perspectives that may attenuate groupthink. Additionally, an 
independent director is likely to act as a better monitor of managers and hence could 
more effectively constrain collusion in earnings management or even fraud (Beasley 
1996). As a result, I expect that higher board independence will alleviate the adverse 
impact on reporting quality of having TMTs with homogeneous background and long 
shared experience. 
In terms of audit committee tenure, there are two opposing views. On one hand, 
there could be a learning curve for the audit committee. As committee members 
accumulate more firm-specific experience and knowledge, they may be better able to 
detect problems and exercise more effective monitoring over managers (Beasley 1996). 
However, longer working relationships with the managers may compromise their 
independence (Vafeas 2005). Firms with TMTs that have long shared experience and 
similar backgrounds are at greater risk of groupthink and collusion. The costs from the 
loss of independence may exceed the benefits from firm-specific knowledge. Audit 
committee members who have worked with the long-tenured TMTs for a long time may 
be less effective in identifying and correcting improper financial reporting behavior as 
they become friends of the managers over time. As a result, I expect that having a long-
tenured audit committee will exacerbate the adverse impact on financial reporting quality 
of having TMTs with homogeneous background and long shared experience.   
To test the cross-sectional variations, I estimate the logistic regression in equation 
(3) using two dummy variables (H and L) to distinguish above median and below median 
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independent director percentage (or audit committee tenure). The two dummy variables 
are interacted with each of the regressors other than industry and year fixed effects. 
Under this approach, the slope for each regressor will be estimated separately for firms 
with above median independent director percentage (or audit committee tenure) and firms 
with below median independent director percentage (or audit committee tenure). 
 
Restate = ∑ (𝐻𝑑=𝐿  βd,0 + βd,1 Team_Homo10 + βd,2 Team_SharedExp10 + βd,3 Team_Size  
+ Firm Characteristics + Managerial Characteristics  
+ Auditor Characteristics + Corporate Governance) +Year FE  
+ Industry FE + ɛ               (3) 
 
Table 7 reports the estimation results. Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficient 
estimates for firms with below median and above median percentage of independent 
directors, respectively. Consistent with the expectation, TMT shared experience and 
homogeneity are more positively associated with restatements for firms with more 
independent directors, indicating that having a more independent board helps to alleviate 
the adverse impact of TMTs with similar backgrounds and long shared experiences. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates for firms with below and above median 
audit committee tenure, respectively. Having long-tenured audit committees increases the 
adverse impact of TMT shared experience, possibly due to the loss of independence as 
audit committee members work with the managers for a long time. The coefficient on 
Team_Homo10 is larger for firms with above median audit committee tenure than firms 
with below median audit committee tenure; however, the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
39 
 
 
 
6.2 Positions of Top Executives 
In the main analysis, I include all the managers disclosed as executive officers in 
the firm’s 10-K. In this section, I examine whether the effects of TMT characteristics on 
reporting quality vary with the position of the manager. As an outsider, it is difficult to 
tell whether a manager plays a role in determining the firms’ reporting quality or not. 
Positions such as CFO, controller, and treasurer clearly play an important role in 
determining financial reporting quality. However, other positions such as divisional or 
regional heads, VP-Sales, and COO seem more ambiguous. In this analysis, I try to 
separate the positions that are more directly related to the corporate accounting function 
from other positions.  
Table 8 provides the results of the logistic regression of Restate on different 
members of the TMT. Column 1 shows the results for the entire TMT. Column 2 shows 
the results for managers who are more directly related to the corporate accounting 
function, which include CEO, CFO, Chairman, President, Controller, Treasurer, VP-Tax, 
VP-Internal Audit, General Counsel, and VP-Investor Relations. Column 3 includes all 
managers except the ones included in Column 2. The coefficient on Team_Homo10 is 
positive for both Columns 2 and 3; the magnitude of the coefficient is also similar. It 
indicates that both the homogeneity within the corporate accounting function and 
homogeneity among other top managers affect firms’ financial reporting quality. The 
coefficient on Team_SharedExp10 is only significantly positive in Column 2; the 
coefficient in Column 3 is positive but not significant. It shows that shared working 
experience matters most for the managers directly related to the corporate accounting 
function.  
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I also try to separate the top tier managers from their subordinates. Column 4 of 
Table 8 reports the results for the top tier executives only, which include the Chairman, 
CEO, President, and CFO. Column 5 shows the results for the entire TMT after excluding 
the top tier executives included in Column 4. Both Team_Homo10 and 
Team_SharedExp10 are positively associated with restatements in Columns 4 and 5, 
indicating that the documented effect of the TMT is not driven by the top tier executives 
such as the CEO and CFO only. Other subordinate executives in the TMT also play a role 
in determining the firms’ financial reporting quality.   
If we compare the coefficients in Column 1 with those in Columns 2 to 5, we can 
observe that the coefficients on Team_Homo10 and Team_SharedExp10 are the largest in 
Column 1, when homogeneity and shared experience are calculated using the entire top 
management team. This result suggests that the entire TMT is a reasonable target group 
when examining the impact of the top management team on financial reporting quality.  
 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
6.3 Endogenous Hiring Decisions and CEO Power 
CEOs participate in the hiring and firing of other top managers. It is possible that 
the relation between TMT characteristics and financial reporting quality is driven by the 
endogenous hiring decisions of the CEO. For example, CEOs attempting to manage 
earnings may try to hire or promote top managers who share similar values and 
preferences with them and keep those top managers for a long time. To address this 
concern, I examine whether the effects of TMT homogeneity and shared experience on 
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reporting quality differ across TMTs that are primarily hired or promoted by the current 
CEO or not.  
I estimate the following logistic regression in equation (4). CEO_Hire50Per is an 
indicator variable that equals one if more than half of the top managers become Vice 
President or above after the current CEO takes office, and zero otherwise. The variables 
of interest are β4 and β5. If the association between TMT characteristics and financial 
reporting quality is driven by the endogenous hiring decisions of the CEO, we should 
observe a larger effect for TMTs hired primarily by the CEO and hence a positive 
coefficient for β4 and β5. 
 
Restate = β0 + β1 Team_Homo10 + β2 Team_SharedExp10 + β3 CEO_Hire50Per  
+ β4 Team_Homo10×CEO_Hire50Per + β5Team_SharedExp10×CEO_Hire50Per  
+ β6 Team_Size + Firm Characteristics + Managerial Characteristics  
+ Auditor Characteristics + Corporate Governance +Year FE + Industry FE + ɛ    
(4) 
 
Column 1 of Table 9 reports the logistic regression results. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are not different from zero. The results show that there is no significant 
difference between the effect of TMTs that are primarily hired by the current CEO and 
TMTs that are not, indicating that the documented relation between reporting quality and 
TMT characteristics is unlikely to be driven by CEOs hiring and retaining similar people 
to satisfy their earnings management incentives.  
In Columns 2 and 3, I replace CEO_Hire50Per with two other variables that 
measure CEO power, i.e. CEO_Payslice and CEO_Chair.  CEO_Payslice is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the CEO’s compensation as a percentage of the total 
compensation of the five highest paid employees is above the sample median, and zero 
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otherwise. CEO_Chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the 
Chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. If the CEO’s endogenous hiring decisions are 
driving the results, the effect should be stronger when the CEO is more powerful within 
the firm and hence is more able to determine the hiring and firing of other top managers. 
The results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 show that the interaction terms between the 
CEO power variables and TMT characteristics are not reliably different from zero, 
suggesting that the impact of TMT characteristics on reporting quality does not differ 
across firms with more or less powerful CEOs.    
    
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
 
6.4 Separate Analyses of Homogeneity Attributes 
In the main analysis, team homogeneity is measured using a composite 
homogeneity measure of three attributes including education level, functional 
background, and firm tenure. In this section, I repeat the analyses by including the 
homogeneity measures for each attribute separately. Column 1 to 4 of Table 10 report 
the logistic regression results for each of the three homogeneity attributes. The 
results suggest that each of the three attributes is significantly related to firms’ 
financial reporting quality.  
In addition, I examine only the effect of job related diversity (also called deep 
level diversity), which includes diversity in education, functional background, and 
tenure in the main analysis. There is non-job related diversity (also called surface level 
diversity) in demographic traits such as age, race, and gender. I focus on job related 
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diversity because the knowledge and skills of the managers that affect their financial 
reporting decisions are more likely to be shaped by job related experiences. In 
addition, job related diversity is shown to increase task related debates that enhance team 
performance, while non-job related diversity is associated with more emotional 
conflicts that may not be beneficial to performance (Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999; 
Simmons et al. 1999). As a result, job related diversity is more likely to introduce 
diverse perspectives and promote healthy debates among the TMTs, which provide 
the checks and balances in the financial reporting processes. In contrast, non-job 
related diversity is more prone to the counter arguments that TMT diversity may result 
in more political activities and power struggles that may motivate some managers to 
manipulate earnings.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 10 report the results for gender and age homogeneity
10
, 
respectively. The coefficients are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that non-
job related diversity does not significantly relate to firms’ financial reporting quality.  
 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
 
6.5 Faultlines 
Faultlines are “hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into subgroups 
based on one or more attributes” and they become stronger when “more attributes align 
                                                          
10
 Similar to the case of tenure homogeneity, age homogeneity is calculated after converting age to a 
categorical variable with 10-year increments. Managers are divided into four categories with age (1) 
between 30 and 39, (2) between 40 and 49, (3) between 50 and 59, and (4) 60 and above. Age homogeneity 
(Age_Homo)  is calculated using the sum of squared proportion of managers in each of the four age 
categories. Gender homogeneity (Gender_Homo) is calculated using the sum of squared proportion of 
female and male managers. I use the decile ranking of age and gender homogeneity (Age_Homo10, 
Gender_Homo10) normalized to range between 0 and 1 in the regression. 
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themselves in the same way” (Lau and Murignhan, 1998). The faultline concept takes into 
account not only the dispersion of attributes among team members but also the pattern of 
dispersion. Suppose firm A and firm B each has four top executives. The functional 
background, education level, and firm tenure of each manager are listed in the following 
table. 
 Firm A Firm B 
Manager 1 Accounting, Master, 9 years Accounting, Bachelor, 31 years 
Manager 2 Accounting, Master, 8 years Accounting, Master, 9 years 
Manager 3 Manufacturing, Bachelor, 31 years Manufacturing, Bachelor, 33 years 
Manager 4 Manufacturing, Bachelor, 33 years Manufacturing, Master, 8 years 
 
Firms A and B will have the same homogeneity measure (Blau’s Index) for each 
of the three dimensions because we observe the same dispersion in each of the three 
attributes when viewed in isolation. However, when we take into account the interaction 
of different attributes, the pattern in firm A is much more likely to elicit social 
subcategorization and separation within the team compared with the pattern in firm B. 
There exists a clear dividing line in firm A because we can group the four managers into 
two subgroups and all the managers within each subgroup have the same characteristics 
in all the three attributes. And all the managers across the two subgroups have different 
characteristics in all the three attributes. In contrast, it is much more difficult to draw a 
clear dividing line for firm B because the pattern of distribution among attributes is more 
random. Firm A is considered to have stronger faultline strength than firm B. 
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Strong Faultlines suggest clear distinctions among team members and greater 
chance of subgroup formations within the team. The homogeneity measures (Blau’s 
Index) used in my analysis mainly capture the variety of managers in education, career 
tracks, and firm-specific experiences because the maximum diversity is achieved when 
we observe even spread of managers across all possible categories in each dimension 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). In contrast, faultline strength mainly captures separation of 
managers within the TMT. It is ex ante unclear how faultlines will affect financial 
reporting quality. On one hand, subgroupings and separations may reduce social 
integration and hence reduce the chance of collusion in intentional earnings management 
or fraud. On the other hand, strong separations may reduce communications across 
subgroups, increase conflicts and political activities, and negatively affect team 
performance (Lau and Murnighan 2005; Li and Hambrick 2005). The lack of healthy 
communications may weaken internal control effectiveness; heightened political activities 
and power struggles may create incentives to manage earnings.  
In this section, I examine whether faultline strength has an effect on financial 
reporting quality incremental to team homogeneity measured using Blau (1977) index. I 
follow the approach in Shaw (2004) to measure faultline strength, which is calculated in 
three steps: (1) compute internal alignment within subgroups (IA); (2) compute external 
alignment across subgroups (CGAI); (3) calculate faultline strength (FLS) using IA×(1-
CGAI). FLS reaches the maximum when there is maximum within-subgroup alignment 
and minimum cross-subgroup alignment.
11
 I use the decile ranking of faultline strength 
normalized to the range between 0 and 1 (Team_FLS10) in the regression to facilitate 
                                                          
11
 Please refer to the Appendix in Shaw (2004) from page 91 to 99 for detailed procedures for calculating the 
faultline strength measures. 
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interpretation of the coefficient. I first measure faultline strength using all the five 
available characteristics including three job related characteristics (education level, 
functional background, and firm tenure) and two non-job related characteristics (gender 
and age). Then, I examine faultline strength in job related characteristics and non-job 
related characteristics separately. I estimate the logistic regression of Restate on TMT 
faultline strength after controlling for TMT homogeneity and shared experience based on 
equation (5).   
 
Restate = β0 + β1 Team_Homo10 + β2 Team_SharedExp10 + β3 Team_FLS10  
+ β4 Team_Size + Firm Characteristics + Managerial Characteristics  
+ Auditor Characteristics + Corporate Governance +Year FE + Industry FE + ɛ   
(5) 
 
Column 1 of Table 11 reports the results for decile ranking of faultline strength 
for all the five characteristics (Team_FLS_All10). Columns 2 and 3 report the results for 
decile ranking of faultline strength for the three job related characteristics 
(Team_FLS_Job10) and two non-job related characteristics (Team_FLS_NonJob10), 
respectively. The coefficients on Team_FLS_All10 and Team_FLS_Job10 are statistically 
indifferent from zero, while the coefficient on Team_FLS_NonJob10 is positive and 
significant at less than 10% level. There is some evidence that strong faultlines in gender 
and age are associated with more accounting mistakes and hence poorer financial 
reporting quality. Moving from the lowest to the highest decile of faultline strength on 
age and gender, the odds of restatements will increase by 60%. The results may be driven 
by increasing emotional conflicts and frictions in group functioning caused by strong 
distinctions in gender and age, which may reduce communication and internal control 
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effectiveness and result in group politics and power struggles that incentivize earnings 
management.  
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
 
6.6 Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
In the main analysis, I use restatements as the proxy for financial reporting quality. 
Restatements have a low Type I error rate, because restating firms unambiguously made 
GAAP-violating mistakes in their financial statements (Dechow et al. 2010). However, 
restatements may contain relatively larger Type II error because there could be firms with 
accounting errors that were not discovered and firms involving in within-GAAP accrual 
earnings management. In addition, managers may engage in real activities management 
such as cutting discretionary expenditure and overproducing inventories (Roychowdhury 
2006) in order to boost earnings. These real earnings management activities will not 
result in GAAP violations.  
To address this concern, I examine accrual and real earnings management 
activities when firms face income-increasing earnings management incentives. I identify 
firms with upward earnings management incentives using (1) firm-years that just meet or 
beat the analyst consensus forecast by one cent, (2) firm-years that just meet or beat the 
management forecast by one cent, (3) firm-years that just meet or beat last year’s EPS by 
one cent, and (4) firm-years that just meet or beat the zero benchmark (i.e. actual EPS 
greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.5% of stock price). I identify 410 suspect firm-
years following this procedure. Then, I examine whether measures for accrual and real 
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earnings management differ with TMT homogeneity and shared experience for the 
suspect firms. 
I estimate abnormal accruals using the performance matched Jones (1991) model. 
For each fiscal year and two-digit SIC-code industry, I estimate equation (6). I require at 
least 15 observations for each regression. Discretionary accrual is the residual from 
equation (6). Performance matched discretionary accrual (AEM) is the estimated 
discretionary accrual adjusted for the mean discretionary accrual for firms in the same 
industry year and quintile of ROA.  
 
Accrualt = a + b1 (1/ATt-1) + b2 Csalet + b3 PPEt + et                                                   (6)  
 
Where Accrualt is the earnings before extraordinary items minus the operating 
cash flows scaled by lagged total assets; ATt-1 is the lagged total assets; Csalet is the 
change in sales from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged total assets; PPEt is the gross 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; ROA is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. 
Real earnings management is measured by the abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, following Roychowdhury (2006). For each fiscal 
year and two-digit SIC-code industry, I estimate the following equations. I require at least 
15 observations for each regression. Real earnings management through overproduction 
(REM_PROD) is the residual from equation (7). Real earnings management through 
cutting discretionary expenditure (REM_DISX) is the residual from equation (8) 
multiplied by negative one.  
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PRODt = a + b1 (1/ATt-1) + b2 Salet + b3 Csalet + b4 Csalet-1+ et    (7) 
DISXt = a + b1 (1/ATt-1) + b2 Salet-1 + et       (8) 
 
Where PRODt is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year t and the change in 
inventory from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged total assets; Salet is the total sales in 
year t scaled by lagged total assets; Csalet is the change in sales from year t-1 to year t 
scaled by lagged total assets; DISXt is the discretionary expenditures which include R&D, 
advertising and SG&A in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
I regress accrual and real earnings management measures on TMT homogeneity 
and shared experience for the suspect firms using equation (9). The variables of interest 
are β1 and β2. Positive coefficients indicate more accrual or real earnings management 
activities and vice versa. 
 
AEM, REM_PROD, or REM_DISX = β0 + β1 Team_Homo10 + β2 Team_SharedExp10  
+ β3 Team_Size + Firm Characteristics + Managerial Characteristics  
+ Auditor Characteristics + Corporate Governance + ɛ   (9) 
 
Table 12 shows the results for the OLS regression in equation (9). TMT 
homogeneity and shared experience are positively associated with both discretionary 
accruals and real earnings management measures. The results indicate that TMTs with 
similar backgrounds and long shared experience engage in more upward accrual and real 
earnings management when they face income-increasing earnings management incentives. 
Overall, both the restatement and earnings management tests indicate lower financial 
reporting quality for TMTs with more similar background and longer shared experience.  
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Using a sample of 2,658 firm-year observations of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 
2013, this study documents a significant impact of TMT characteristics on firms’ 
financial reporting quality. Results suggest that firms with TMTs that have longer shared 
working experience and similar background are more likely to have misstatements, and 
engage in more accrual and real earnings management when facing income-increasing 
earnings management incentives. Additional analyses suggest that the impact of TMT 
characteristics varies with board characteristics. Board independence helps to alleviate 
the adverse impact on firms’ financial reporting quality of having TMTs with similar 
background and long shared experience, while long-tenured audit committees exaggerate 
such adverse impact.  
The results show that team related issues play an important role in managers’ 
financial reporting decisions incremental to individual managerial characteristics. This is 
a fruitful research area that has been largely overlooked in the accounting literature. 
Besides that, this study indicates that when we consider the role of the managers and the 
board, a “one size fits all” approach is likely to be problematic. When the management 
team works with different boards or works in firms under different environments, the 
impact could differ significantly.  
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When interpreting the results from this study, we should exercise some caution. 
The conclusion is not the superiority of certain TMT, because we only examine the 
financial reporting aspects of firm decisions. The fact that TMTs with shorter shared 
working experience and more diverse backgrounds are related to higher financial 
reporting quality does not mean that they will yield better overall firm performance. For 
example, homogeneous and long-tenured TMT may be more suitable for firms operating 
in a stable environment (Keck 1997; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella 2009). The 
implication of this study is that TMTs with longer shared experience and homogeneous 
background raise a red flag for the firms’ financial reporting quality. It informs investors, 
auditors, and regulators that we should be more cautious when viewing the financial 
statements of these firms as the risk for unintentional errors and intentional mistakes may 
be higher.  
In addition, this study focuses on the conformity with GAAP and earnings 
management when measuring financial reporting quality. There are other aspects of 
financial reporting quality such as value relevance and persistence. How TMT 
characteristics affect other aspects of reporting quality remains to be explored in future 
studies. 
Moreover, who to hire, promote, and retain is determined by the external and 
internal environment and objectives of the firm. Both the TMTs and the firm environment 
and objectives will mutually shape the firms’ strategies and outcomes (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984). This dynamic process raises the concern that some omitted firm 
characteristics may result in both homogenous and long-tenured TMTs and poor financial 
reporting quality. We can only conclude that TMT characteristics have incremental 
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explanatory power for financial reporting quality after controlling for the many firm and 
managerial characteristics documented in the prior literature.  
Finally, this study uses a sample of S&P 500 firms. TMTs may play a more 
important role in the decision-making of these large firms because they are less likely to 
be controlled by any single individual. As a result, we should exercise some caution when 
trying to generalize the results of this study to firms that are much smaller in size.
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APPENDIX 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Restate 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if 10-Q 
or 10-K issued by the firm during a fiscal year 
is misreported and subsequently restated due to 
accounting mistakes, and 0 otherwise  
AuditAnalytics 
Restate_Irr 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if 
Restate equals to 1 and the restatement is 
identified as fraud in AuditAnalytics or results 
in SEC or Board Investigation or Class action 
lawsuits, and 0 otherwise 
AuditAnalytics 
Restate_BL 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if 
Restate equals to 1 and the restatement results 
in changes in the reported net income or 
shareholders’ equity, and 0 otherwise 
AuditAnalytics 
Restate_Negret 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if 
Restate equals to 1 and the cumulative 
abnormal return during the seven-day window 
(-1, 5) around the restatement announcement 
date is negative, and 0 otherwise 
AuditAnalytics, 
CRSP 
Team_SharedExp 
= 
1
𝑁
∑ min⁡(𝑢𝑖⁡,
⁡
𝑖≠𝑗
⁡𝑢𝑗)  
where N is the total number of pairs of 
managers within the TMT and ui is the number 
of years manager i was promoted to the level 
of Vice President or higher in the firm.  
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Team_SharedExp10 
Decile ranking of  Team_SharedExp ranging 
from 0 to 1 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Educ_Homo 
Educ_Homo = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  
Where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of executives in one 
of the five categories based on the managers’ 
highest degree level, i.e. (1) High School, (2) 
Undergraduate, (3) Master, (4) JD, and (5) 
PhD.  
Educ_Homo10 is the decile ranking of 
Educ_Homo normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
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Function_Homo 
Function_Homo = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  
Where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of executives in one 
of the seven categories based on the managers’ 
past career tracks, i.e. (1) general business, (2) 
finance and accounting, (3) marketing, sales 
and public relations, (4) research and 
engineering, (5) production and operations, (6) 
legal, (7) human resource management.  
Function_Homo10 is the decile ranking of 
Function_Homo normalized to range from 0 to 
1. 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Tenure_Homo 
Tenure_Homo = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  
Where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of executives in one 
of the five categories based on the managers’ 
years of service with the firm, i.e. (1) less than 
or equal to 10 years, (2) between 11 to 20 
years, (3) between 21 to 30 years, (4) between 
31 to 40 years, and (5) more than 40 years. 
Tenure_Homo10 is the decile ranking of 
Tenure_Homo normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Team_Homo 
The average of the normalized value of 
Educ_Homo, Function_Homo, and 
Tenure_Homo. 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Team_Homo10 
Decile ranking of Team_Homo ranging from 0 
to 1 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Team_Size 
The number of managers disclosed as 
executive officers in a firm’s 10-K 
10-K, Proxy 
Statement 
Size 
Natural log of the market value of equity = 
Ln(PRCC_F * CSHO) 
Compustat, 10-K 
BTM 
Book-to-market ratio =  CEQ / (PRCC_F * 
CSHO) 
Compustat, 10-K 
Leverage 
Total debt divided by total assets = 
(DLCC+DLT) / AT 
Compustat, 10-K 
ROA 
Income before extraordinary items scaled by 
beginning total assets = IBt / ATt-1 
Compustat, 10-K 
Std_Ret 
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for 
the last three years 
CRSP 
Firm_Age 
Number of years since the first year that the 
firm is publicly traded 
CRSP 
Ext_Finance 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if net 
debt issuance is more than 10% of the 
beginning total assets or the increase in 
common shares outstanding is greater than 
10% in the year, and 0 otherwise  
Compustat, 10-K 
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M&A 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
firm engaged in a merger or acquisition in the 
current year for which the deal value exceeds 
10% of the beginning of the year market value 
of the firm, and 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Religion 
The fraction of population that are religious 
adherents in the county of the firm’s 
headquarter 
American 
Religion Data 
Archive 
CEO_Incentive 
A share of CEO’s total compensation that 
could come from a one percentage point 
increase in the stock price of the company 
defined in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
ExecuComp 
CFO_Incentive 
A share of CFO’s total compensation that 
could come from a one percentage point 
increase in the stock price of the company 
defined in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
ExecuComp 
CEO_Female 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
CEO is female and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
CFO_Female 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
CFO is female and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
CEO_Tenure 
Number of years the executive served as the 
CEO of the company 
BoardEx 
CFO_Tenure 
Number of years the executive served as the 
CFO of the company 
BoardEx 
New_CEO 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
tenure of the CEO is less than or equal to two 
years, and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
New_CFO 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
tenure of the CFO is less than or equal to two 
years, and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
CEO_Age Age of the CEO BoardEx 
CFO_Age Age of the CFO BoardEx 
New_Auditor 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if 
auditor tenure is less than or equal to two years 
and 0 otherwise 
AuditAnalytics 
Auditor_Tenure 
Number of years the audit firm has served as 
the auditor of the company 
AuditAnalytics  
Audit_Fee Natural log of total audit fees AuditAnalytics  
Nonaudit_Fee Natural log of total nonaudit fees AuditAnalytics  
Inst_Per 
The percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders 
Thomson 13F 
CEO_Chair 
An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the 
CEO also serves as chairman of the board in a 
given firm-year, and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx, 10-K, 
Company 
Website 
Indep_Per 
The percentage of independent board of 
directors  
ISS 
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AuditComm_Tenure 
The average tenure of audit committee 
members 
ISS 
Geoseg 
The number of geographic segments of the 
firm 
Compustat 
Sic2seg 
The number of two-digit SIC segments of the 
firm 
Compustat 
AEM 
Abnormal accruals estimated using modified 
Jones (1991) model augmented with ROA 
Compustat 
REM_PROD 
Abnormal production costs estimated 
following Roychowdhury (2006) 
Compustat 
REM_DISX 
Abnormal discretionary expenditures estimated 
following Roychowdhury (2006) multiplied by 
negative one 
Compustat 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbott, L., Parker, S., and G. Peters. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and 
restatements. Auditing 23, 69–87. 
Acharya, V. V., Myers, S. C., and R. G. Rajan. 2011. The internal governance of firms. 
The Journal of Finance 66(3), 689-720. 
Agrawal, A., and S. Chadha. 2005. Corporate governance and accounting scandals. 
Journal of Law and Economics 48, 371–406. 
Ali, A., and W. Zhang. 2015. CEO tenure and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 59(1), 60-79. 
Armstrong, C., Jagolinzer, A., and D. Larcker. 2010. Chief executive officer equity 
incentives and accounting irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research 48,225–271. 
Baker, T., Collins, D., and A. Reitenga. 2003. Stock option compensation and earnings 
management incentives. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 18,557–582. 
Bantel, K. A., and S. Jackson, S. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: 
Does the composition of the top team make a difference?. Strategic Management 
Journal 10, 107–124. 
Barua, A., Davidson, L. F., Rama, D. V., and S. Thiruvadi. 2010. CFO gender and 
accruals quality. Accounting Horizons 24(1), 25-39. 
Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71, 443–465. 
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings 
management. Journal of Financial Economics 80(3), 511-529. 
Blau, P. 1977, Inequality and Heterogeneity, New York: The Free Press. 
Byrne, Donn. 1971. The Attraction Paradigm. New York: Academic Press. 
Carpenter, M. A. 2002. The implications of strategy and social context for the 
relationship between top management team heterogeneity and firm performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 23, 275–284. 
Carpenter, M. A., and J. W. Fredrickson. 2001. Top management teams, global strategic 
posture, and the moderating role of uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal 44, 
533–546. 
58 
 
 
 
Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., and W. G. Sanders. 2004. Upper echelons 
research revisited: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team 
composition. Journal of Management 30(6), 749-778. 
Carroll, G. R., and J. R. Harrison. 1998. Organizational demography and culture: Insights 
from a formal model and simulation. Administrative Science Quarterly 43(3), 637-
667. 
Chen, C., Lin, C., and Y. Lin. 2008. Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and 
discretionary accruals: does long auditor tenure impair earnings quality?. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 25, 447–471. 
Cheng, Q., Lee, J., and T. J. Shevlin. 2015. Internal governance and real earnings 
management. The Accounting Review (forthcoming). 
Cheng, Q., and T.D. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 80(2), 441-476. 
Cyert, R. M., and J. G. March. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 2 
Daboub, A. J., Rasheed, A. M., Priem, R. L., and D. A. Gray. 1995. Top management 
team characteristics and corporate illegal activity. Academy of Management Review 
20, 138-170. 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., and C. Schrand. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of 
the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 50(2), 344-401. 
DeFond, M., and J. Jiambalvo. 1991. Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors. 
The Accounting Review 66(3), 643–655. 
Drucker, P. 1974. Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Dyreng, S. D., Mayew, W. J., and C. D. Williams, C. 2012. Religious social norms and 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 39(7‐8), 
845-875. 
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., and E. Swanson. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate 
financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 85, 667–708. 
Esser, J. K. 1998. Alive and well after twenty-five years: A review of groupthink 
research. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73, 116–141. 
Feng, M., Ge, W., Luo, S., and T. Shevlin. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in 
material accounting manipulations?. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(1), 21-
36. 
59 
 
 
 
Ferguson, M., Seow, G., and D. Young. 2004. Nonaudit services and earnings 
management: UK evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 21, 813–841. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2010. Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8. 
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1990. Top-management-team tenure and 
organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 484–503. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., and A. A. Cannella. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory 
and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University 
Press. 
Francis, B., Hasan, I., Park, J. C., and Q. Wu. 2014. Gender differences in financial 
reporting decision making: Evidence from accounting conservatism. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 32(3), 1285-1318. 
Francis, J., Maydew, E., and H. Sparks. 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals. Auditing 18, 17–34. 
Frankel, R., Johnson, M., and K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors’ fees for 
nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77, 71–105. 
Friedman, H. L. 2014. Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to 
bias reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58(1), 117-141. 
Ge, W., Matsumoto, D., and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs Have Style? An Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Accounting Practices. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 28(4), 1141-1179. 
Gigerenzer, G., and R. Selten. 2002. Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. MIT 
Press. 
Hackman, J. R. 1976. Group influences on individuals. Handbook of industrial and 
organizational psychology 1455-1525.  
Hambrick, D. C. 1994. Top management groups: A conceptual integration and 
reconsideration of the “team” label. Research in Organizational Behavior 16, 171–
213.  
Hambrick, D. C. and G. D. S. Fukutomi. 1991. The seasons of a CEO's tenure. Academy 
of Management Review 16, 719-742. 
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a 
reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9: 193–206. 
Hambrick, D. C., Cho, T. S., and M. J. Chen. 1996. The influence of top management 
team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
659-684. 
60 
 
 
 
Harrison, D. A., and K. J. Klein. 2007. What's the difference? Diversity constructs as 
separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of Management Review 
32(4), 1199-1228. 
Harrison, D. A., Price, K. H., and M. P. Bell. 1998. Beyond relational demography: Time 
and effects of surface and deep-level diversity on work group cohesion. Academy of 
Management Journal 41, 96–107. 
Healy, P. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 7, 85–107. 
Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature 
and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4), 365-383. 
Hensley, T. R., and G. W. Griffin. 1986. Victims of groupthink: The Kent State 
University board of trustees and the 1977 gymnasium controversy. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 30, 497–531. 
Hoffman, L. R., and N. R. Maier. 1961. Quality and acceptance of problem solutions by 
members of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. The Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 62(2), 401. 
Huang, H. W., Rose-Green, E., and C. C. Lee. 2012. CEO age and financial reporting 
quality. Accounting Horizons 26(4), 725-740. 
Hwang, B., and S. Kim. 2012. Earnings management and social ties. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1215962 
Jackson, S. E., Brett, J. F., Sessa, V. I., Cooper, D. M., Julin, J. A., and K. Peyronnin. 
1991. Some differences make a difference: Individual dissimilarity and group 
heterogeneity as correlates of recruitment, promotions, and turnover. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 76(5), 675. 
Janis, I. 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Jehn, K. A., Northcraft, G. B., and M. A. Neale. 1999. Why differences make a 
difference: a field study of diversity, conflict, and performance in workgroups. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 44, 743-763. 
Jiang, J. X., Petroni, K. R., and I. Y. Wang. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most 
influence on earnings management?. Journal of Financial Economics 96(3), 513-526. 
Johnson, V., Khurana, I., and J. Reynolds. 2002. Audit-firm tenure and the quality of 
financial reports. Contemporary Accounting Research 19, 637–660. 
Jones, J. J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29(2), 193-228. 
Katz, R. 1982. The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and 
Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 27, 81-104. 
61 
 
 
 
Keck, S. L. 1997. Top management team structure: Differential effects by environment 
context. Organization Science 8(2), 143–156. 
Khanna, V., Kim, E., and Y. Lu. 2015. CEO connectedness and corporate fraud. The 
Journal of Finance 70(3), 1203-1252. 
Kilduff, M., Angelmar, R., and A. Mehra. 2000. Top management-team diversity and 
firm performance: Examining the role of cognitions. Organization Science 11(1), 21-
34. 
Kinney, W., Palmrose, Z., and S. Scholz. 2004. Auditor independence, non-audit 
services, and restatements: was the U.S. government right? Journal of Accounting 
Research 42, 561–588. 
Knight, D., Pearce, C. L., Smith, K. G., Olian, J. D., Sims, H. P., Smith, K. A., and P. 
Flood. 1999. Top management team diversity, group process, and strategic consensus. 
Strategic Management Journal 20(5), 445-465. 
Knippenberg, D., and M. C. Schippers. 2007. Work group diversity. Annual Review of 
Psychology 58, 515-541. 
Kothari, S. P. 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31(1), 105-231. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary 
accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1), 163-197. 
Kor, Y. Y. 2006. Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board 
compositions on R&D investment strategy. Strategic Management Journal 27(11), 
1081-1099. 
Krishnan, G. V., Raman, K. K., Yang, K., and W. Yu. 2011. CFO/CEO-board social ties, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and earnings management. Accounting Horizons 25(3), 537-557. 
Larcker, D., Richardson, S., and I. Tuna. 2007. Corporate governance, accounting 
outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review 82, 963–1008. 
Lau, D. C., and J. Κ. Murnighan. 1998. Demographic diversity and faultlines: The 
compositional dynamics of organizational groups. Academy of Management Review 
23, 325-340. 
Lau, D. C., and J. Κ. Murnighan. 2005. Interactions within groups and subgroups: the 
effects of demographic faultlines. Academy of Management Journal 48(4), 645-659. 
Li, J., and D. C. Hambrick. 2005. Factional groups: a new vantage on demographic 
faultlines, conflict,and disintegration in work teams. Academy of Management 
Journal 48(5), 794-813. 
62 
 
 
 
Lott, A. J., and B. E. Lott. 1965. Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: a review 
of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. Psychological bulletin 
64(4), 259. 
March, J. G., and H. A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. 
McAnally, M. L., Srivastava, A., and C. D. Weaver. 2008. Executive stock options, 
missed earnings targets, and earnings management. The Accounting Review 83(1), 
185-216. 
McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., and N. Y. Sharp. 2012. The impact of religion on financial 
reporting irregularities. The Accounting Review 87(2), 645-673. 
Moore, Wilbert. 1962. The Conduct of the Corporation. New York: Random House 
Vintage. 
O’Reilly, C.A., III, Caldwell, C., and D. Barnett. 1989. Work group demography, social 
integration, and turnover. Administrative Science Quarterly 34, 21-37. 
Pelled, L. H., Eisenhardt, K. M., and K. R. Xin. 1999. Exploring the black box: An 
analysis of work group diversity, conflict and performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 44(1), 1-28. 
Pfeffer, J. 1983. Organizational demography, In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Eds.) 
Research in organizational behavior 5, 299–357. 
Pourciau, S. 1993. Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 16(1), 317-336. 
Priem, R. L. 1990. Top management team group factors, consensus, and firm 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 11(6), 469. 
Richardson, S., I. Tuna, and M. Wu. 2002. Predicting Earnings Management: The Case 
of Earnings Restatements. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 335-370. 
Schippers, M. C., Den Hartog, D. N., and P. L. Koopman. 2007. Reflexivity in teams: a 
measure and correlates. Applied Psychology 56(2), 189-211.   
Shaw, J. B. 2004. The development and analysis of a measure of group 
faultlines. Organizational Research Methods 7(1), 66-100. 
Simon, A.1957. Models of Man, New York. 
Simons, T., Pelled, L. H., and K. A. Smith. 1999. Making use of difference: Diversity, 
debate, and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams. Academy of 
management journal 42(6), 662-673. 
63 
 
 
 
Smith, K. G., Smith, K. A., Olian, J., Sims, H., O’Bannon, D., and J. Scully. 1994.Top 
management team demography and process: The role of social integration and 
communication. Administrative Science Quarterly 39, 412–438. 
Tetlock, P. E. 1979. Identifying victims of groupthink from public statements of decision 
makers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, 1314–1324. 
Tetlock, P. E., Peterson, R. S., McGuire, C., Chang, S., and P. Feld. 1992. Assessing 
political group dynamics: A test of the groupthink model. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 63, 403–425. 
Tihanyi, L., Ellstrand, A. E., Daily, C. M., and D. R. Dalton. 2000. Composition of the 
top management team and firm international diversification. Journal of Management 
26(6), 1157-1177. 
Turner, M. E., and A. R. Pratkanis. 1998. A social identity model of groupthink. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73, 210–235. 
Vafeas, N. 2005. Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 22(4), 1093-1122. 
Wagner, W. G., Pfeffer, J., and C. A. O’Reilly. 1984 Organizational demography and 
turnover in top-management groups. Administrative Science Quarterly 29, 74-92. 
West, M. A., and N. R. Anderson. 1996. Innovation in top management teams. Journal of 
Applied psychology 81(6), 680. 
Wiersema, M. F., and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in Japanese firms: 
Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. 
Academy of Management Journal 36(5), 996-1025. 
Wiersema, M. F., and K. A. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and 
corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35(1), 91-121. 
Williams, K. Y., and C. A. O’Reilly. 1998. Demography and Diversity in Organizations: 
A review of 40 years of research. Research in Organizational Behavior 20, 77-140. 
Zenger, T. R. and B. S. Lawrence. 1989. Organizational Demography: The Differential 
Effects of Age and Tenure Distributions on Technical Communication. Academy of 
Management Journal 32, 353-376.
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Top Management Team Positions 
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Table 1 Distribution of the Sample 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
S&P 500 composite firms at the end of 2013 500 
Less financial institutions (SIC Code: 6000 - 6999) 86 
Less firms in regulated industries (SIC Code: 4400 - 4999) 63 
Less firms with less than three years' financial data 15 
Number of firms in the sample 336 
Number of firm-year observations in the sample 2658 
  
Panel B: Distribution of Observations by Industry 
 
Two Digit SIC Code Industry Description Observations Percentage 
01 - 09 
Agriculture, Forestry, And 
Fishing 8 0.30% 
10 - 14 Mining 244 9.18% 
15 – 17 Construction 48 1.81% 
20 – 39 Manufacturing 1527 57.45% 
40 - 43 Transportation 40 1.50% 
50 - 51 Wholesale Trade 64 2.41% 
52 - 59 Retail Trade 328 12.34% 
70 - 89 Services 383 14.41% 
99 Other 16 0.60% 
 Total 2658 100.00% 
  
Panel C: Distribution of Observations by Year 
 
Year Observations Percentage 
2006 323 12.15% 
2007 328 12.34% 
2008 331 12.45% 
2009 333 12.53% 
2010 335 12.60% 
2011 336 12.64% 
2012 336 12.64% 
2013 336 12.64% 
Total 2658 100.00% 
 
Notes: 
Table 1 reports information related to sample selection and distribution. Panel A explains the sample 
selection process. Panel B reports the industry distribution of the sample. Panel C reports the year 
distribution of the sample. 
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Table 2 Top Management Team Characteristics 
Panel A Frequency of Disclosure by Title 
 
Title Percentage of Firm-years Disclosing the Position 
CEO 100.00% 
CFO 100.00% 
General Counsel 89.16% 
Divisional Head 74.27% 
VP-Human Resource 60.35% 
Controller 56.47% 
COO and VP-Operations 38.41% 
VP-Marketing and Sales 33.60% 
VP-Strategy and Business Development 29.16% 
CTO and VP-Research 27.95% 
Treasurer 21.37% 
President 19.15% 
Chief Information Officer 16.63% 
VP-Supply Chain  15.61% 
VP-Public Relations and Communications 15.61% 
Chairman 11.55% 
Vice Chairman 5.76% 
VP-Manufacturing  5.53% 
VP-Tax 4.51% 
VP-Internal Audit 1.88% 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B Education Level 
Highest Degree Obtained Percentage of Observations 
High School 0.94% 
Bachelor 37.59% 
Master 42.37% 
JD 13.55% 
PhD 5.54% 
Total 100.00% 
Panel C Functional Background 
Career Tracks with the Longest Experience Percentage of Observations 
Finance and Accounting 26.28% 
General Management 22.58% 
Research and Engineering 14.04% 
Law 12.56% 
Marketing, Sales, and Public Relations 12.26% 
Production and Operations 6.68% 
Personnel Management 5.61% 
Total 100.00% 
 
Panel D Firm Tenure 
Length of Service  Percentage of Observations 
Less than or equal to 10 years 43.28% 
11 to 20 years 27.21% 
21 to 30 years 18.26% 
31 to 40 years 10.35% 
More than 40 years 0.91% 
Total 100.00% 
 
Notes: 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the top management team. Panel A shows the frequency of 
disclosure for commonly reported positions in the sample firms’ 10-K as executive officers. Panel B 
provides the distribution of managers according to the highest degree obtained. Panel C reports the 
distribution of managers based on the career track on which the manager spent the most time in the past. 
Panel D reports the distribution of managers based on the years of service with the firm.  
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Table 3 Restatement Frequency 
Panel A Distribution of Firms by the Frequency of Restatement 
Number of 
Restatements 
Observations 
 
Percentage 
 
Number of Restated 
Firm-years 
Observations 
 
Percentage 
 
0 212 63.10% 0 212 63.10% 
1 78 23.21% 1 50 14.88% 
2 27 8.04% 2 21 6.25% 
3 15 4.46% 3 25 7.44% 
4  4 1.19% 4 14 4.17% 
Total 336 100.00% 5 8 2.38% 
   6 4 1.19% 
   7 2 0.60% 
   Total 336 100.00% 
 
Panel B Restatement Frequency by Reason 
Restatement Reason Observations 
(Restatements) 
Percentage 
(Restatements) 
Observations 
(Restated firm-years) 
Percentage 
(Restated firm-years) 
Revenue Recognition 20 10.36% 43 12.22% 
Expense Recognition 20 10.36% 36 10.23% 
Asset Recognition 27 13.99% 40 11.36% 
Liability Recognition 19 9.84% 50 14.20% 
Cash Flow  40 20.73% 60 17.05% 
Tax 37 19.17% 77 21.88% 
Notes and Other 30 15.54% 46 13.07% 
Total 193 100% 352 100% 
 
Panel C Distribution of Restated Firm-years by Year 
Year Frequency of 
Restate 
Frequency of 
Restate_Irr 
Frequency of 
Restate_BL 
Frequency of 
Restate_Negret 
2006 6.81% 4.64% 4.64% 4.02% 
2007 6.71% 2.74% 4.88% 3.96% 
2008 7.55% 1.81% 4.23% 3.63% 
2009 8.71% 2.40% 6.01% 3.30% 
2010 11.64% 2.09% 7.16% 5.37% 
2011 15.48% 2.68% 7.44% 8.93% 
2012 16.96% 2.38% 7.44% 8.04% 
2013 16.07% 1.19% 6.55% 8.63% 
 
Notes: 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for restatement. Panel A shows the distribution of firms based on 
the number of restatements (or restated firm-years). Panel B reports the frequency of restatement (or 
restated firm-years) based on the primary reason of the misstatement.  Panel C reports the frequency of 
restated firm-year observations in each year from 2006 to 2013. See Appendix for definitions of the 
variables. 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Restate 2,658 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Restate_Irr 2,658 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Restate_BL 2,658 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Restate_Negret 2,658 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Team_Homo 2,658 0.28 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.34 0.43 
Team_SharedExp  2,658 5.79 2.90 2.75 3.78 5.27 7.16 9.46 
Team_Size 2,658 9.72 3.70 6.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 15.00 
CEO_Tenure 2,658 7.52 6.74 1.00 3.00 6.00 10.00 15.00 
CFO_Tenure 2,658 5.84 5.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 8.00 12.00 
CEO_Age 2,658 56.32 6.36 48.00 52.00 56.00 60.00 64.00 
CFO_Age 2,658 51.45 5.86 44.00 47.00 51.00 55.00 59.00 
CEO_Female 2,658 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CFO_Female 2,658 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO_Incentive 2,658 0.28 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.24 0.39 0.57 
CFO_Incentive 2,658 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.19 0.30 
Size 2,658 9.39 1.08 8.13 8.61 9.23 9.98 10.92 
BTM 2,658 0.38 0.25 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.51 0.71 
Leverage 2,658 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.42 
ROA 2,658 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.18 
Std_Ret 2,658 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 
Firm_Age 2,658 35.64 23.49 10.00 17.00 30.00 47.00 79.00 
Ext_Finance 2,658 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M&A 2,658 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Religion 2,658 0.51 0.10 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.63 
Auditor_Tenure 2,658 28.46 25.19 6.00 10.00 20.00 40.00 69.00 
Audit_Fee 2,658 15.37 0.90 14.21 14.74 15.32 15.93 16.63 
Nonaudit_Fee 2,658 13.53 1.65 11.58 12.68 13.72 14.61 15.38 
Inst_Per 2,658 0.71 0.28 0.00 0.67 0.80 0.89 0.95 
CEO_Chair 2,658 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Indep_Per 2,658 0.81 0.10 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.90 0.91 
AuditComm_Tenure 2,658 8.61 3.76 4.67 6.17 8.00 10.33 13.33 
Geoseg 2,658 4.10 3.38 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 
Sic2seg 2,658 2.34 1.48 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
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Table 4 Continued 
 
Panel B Pearson Correlation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Restate 1.00                
(2)Team_Homo10 0.10*** 1.00               
(3) Team_SharedExp10 0.05*** -0.13
*** 1.00              
(4) Team_Size -0.06*** -0.41*** -0.13*** 1.00             
(5) Size -0.06*** -0.20*** 0.07*** 0.29*** 1.00            
(6) BTM 0.13*** -0.05** -0.05
*** -0.03 -0.20*** 1.00           
(7) Leverage 0.03 -0.07*** -0.01 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.04* 1.00          
(8) ROA -0.09*** -0.02 0.10*** -0.03 0.17*** -0.48*** -0.23*** 1.00         
(9) Std_Ret 0.06*** 0.18*** -0.06*** -0.22*** -0.35
*** 
0.19*** -0.06*** -0.11*** 1.00        
(10) Firm_Age 0.01 -0.27*** 0.03 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.07*** 0.15*** -0.10*** -0.22*** 1.00       
(11) Inst_Per -0.00 -0.03*** 0.13*** -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.07*** -0.03 0.03 0.04** -0.07*** 1.00      
(12) CEO_Chair 0.00 -0.12*** 0.11
*** 
0.08*** 0.13*** -0.03 0.09*** 0.02 -0.10
*** 
0.20*** -0.07*** 1.00     
(13) Indep_Per 0.01 -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.04* 0.13*** -0.10*** -0.03 0.25*** 0.07*** 0.22*** 1.00    
(14) AuditComm_Tenure -0.01 -0.05** 0.22*** -0.03 0.03 -0.06** -0.03 0.08*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.00 -0.14*** 1.00   
(15) Geoseg -0.02 -0.03* -0.10
*** 
0.07*** 0.12*** 0.13*** -0.10*** 0.01 0.10
*** 
0.12*** -0.13*** -0.00 0.11*** 0.01 1.00  
(16) Sic2seg 0.08*** -0.06** 0.08*** 0.04* 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.14*** -0.07*** 0.33*** -0.15*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.08*** 1.00 
 
Notes: 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for main regression variables. Panel A provides summary statistics for the sample. Panel B reports Pearson 
correlation matrix for the main variables. See Appendix for definitions of the variables. ***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
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Table 5 Univariate Analysis 
Panel A Frequency of Restate by TMT Characteristics 
 Team_SharedExp < Sample 
Median 
Team_SharedExp > Sample 
Median 
Team_Homo < Sample 
Median 
 
5.75% 
 
10.15% 
Team_Homo > Sample 
Median 
 
12.78% 
 
16.39% 
 
Panel B Frequency of Restate_Irr by TMT Characteristics 
 
 Team_SharedExp < Sample 
Median 
Team_SharedExp > Sample 
Median 
Team_Homo < Sample 
Median 
 
0.33% 
 
1.53% 
Team_Homo > Sample 
Median 
 
3.61% 
 
4.43% 
 
Panel C Frequency of Restate_BL by TMT Characteristics 
 
 Team_SharedExp < Sample 
Median 
Team_SharedExp > Sample 
Median 
Team_Homo < Sample 
Median 
 
1.97% 
 
5.70% 
Team_Homo > Sample 
Median 
 
7.50% 
 
8.85% 
 
Panel D Frequency of Restate_Negret by TMT Characteristics 
 
 Team_SharedExp < Sample 
Median 
Team_SharedExp > Sample 
Median 
Team_Homo < Sample 
Median 
 
2.13% 
 
4.59% 
Team_Homo > Sample 
Median 
 
6.39% 
 
10.00% 
 
Notes: 
Table 5 reports the univariate analysis. Panel A shows the frequency of restatement (Restate) for four 
subsamples partitioned by the median values of shared experience and team homogeneity. Panel B, C, and 
D report the results for Restate_Irr, Restate_BL, and Restate_Negret, respectively. Restate_Irr represents 
restatement that is identified as fraud or results in SEC or Board Investigation or Class action lawsuits. 
Restate_BL refers to restatement leading to changes in the reported net income or shareholders’ equity. 
Restate_Negret is restatement with negative announcement returns. See Appendix for definitions of the 
variables. 
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Table 6 Restatements and Top Management Team Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Restate Restate_Irr Restate_NonIrr Restate_BL Restate_NonBL Restate_Negret Restate_Posret 
Team_Homo10 1.6575*** 3.0479*** 1.2029*** 2.5633*** 1.0002* 2.0713*** 1.3287*** 
 (4.35) (3.61) (2.91) (5.13) (1.91) (3.53) (2.97) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.9457*** 2.8042*** 0.6791* 1.2513*** 0.8368* 1.2565*** 0.5772 
 (2.77) (4.04) (1.82) (2.66) (1.81) (2.60) (1.25) 
Team_Size -0.0183 -0.0284 -0.0370 -0.0504 0.0136 0.0057 -0.0175 
 (-0.57) (-0.35) (-1.07) (-1.05) (0.38) (0.11) (-0.50) 
New_CEO 0.3630* -0.1826 0.5548** 0.4303 0.4865* 0.4253 0.3785 
 (1.78) (-0.37) (2.53) (1.53) (1.74) (1.49) (1.36) 
New_CFO 0.3706 -0.3939 0.5968** -0.1255 0.6923** 0.2438 0.6232** 
 (1.51) (-0.76) (2.26) (-0.39) (2.21) (0.72) (2.04) 
CEO_Tenure 0.0030 -0.0628 0.0170 0.0474 -0.0126 0.0148 0.0039 
 (0.13) (-1.39) (0.70) (1.39) (-0.40) (0.49) (0.12) 
CFO_Tenure -0.0253 -0.1576* -0.0017 -0.1406*** 0.0356 -0.0035 -0.0295 
 (-0.76) (-1.96) (-0.05) (-2.68) (1.02) (-0.08) (-0.64) 
CEO_Age -0.0185 -0.0259 -0.0124 -0.0229 -0.0175 -0.0442* 0.0031 
 (-0.93) (-0.67) (-0.56) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-1.84) (0.11) 
CFO_Age -0.0021 -0.0891 0.0207 -0.0149 0.0129 -0.0687** 0.0529 
 (-0.09) (-1.32) (0.82) (-0.38) (0.37) (-2.00) (1.63) 
CEO_Female 0.0741 N/A 0.3577 -0.3969 0.1036 0.1551 -0.2784 
 (0.13)  (0.65) (-0.53) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.45) 
CFO_Female -1.4167*** -0.4814 -1.8904*** -1.3173* -1.2664** -0.7139 -2.2768*** 
 (-3.12) (-0.50) (-3.30) (-1.78) (-2.30) (-1.29) (-2.83) 
CEO_Incentive 0.1967 0.7706 0.2602 -1.3607 1.2791* 0.0326 0.3694 
 (0.35) (0.75) (0.40) (-1.58) (1.65) (0.05) (0.42) 
CFO_Incentive 0.5245 -0.6584 0.4755 0.0161 0.8637 0.4297 0.6922 
 (0.48) (-0.26) (0.39) (0.01) (0.64) (0.29) (0.49) 
Size -0.0461 -0.1572 -0.0214 0.4213 -0.5771** -0.3946 0.1091 
 (-0.22) (-0.45) (-0.09) (1.61) (-2.22) (-1.27) (0.41) 
BTM 1.3182** 3.8508*** 0.7391 2.0792*** 0.2927 1.8081*** 1.1169 
 (2.38) (3.61) (1.18) (2.95) (0.43) (2.69) (1.57) 
Leverage 0.4112 3.0048* -0.6226 0.4796 -0.3349 1.3035 -0.4107 
 (0.48) (1.94) (-0.62) (0.35) (-0.31) (1.18) (-0.34) 
ROA -1.3697 -1.9012 -1.8488 -1.8579 -1.2592 -1.3402 -1.3826 
 (-1.20) (-0.61) (-1.53) (-1.36) (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.77) 
Std_Ret 1.6891 -1.1417 4.0389 -2.1970 5.8386 4.4900 -1.8679 
 (0.52) (-0.19) (1.11) (-0.44) (1.45) (0.97) (-0.44) 
Firm_Age -0.0070 -0.0057 -0.0060 -0.0215 0.0036 -0.0043 -0.0091 
 (-0.89) (-0.51) (-0.61) (-1.50) (0.44) (-0.47) (-0.71) 
Ext_Finance -0.2735 -0.2040 -0.3165 -0.3745 -0.2541 0.0057 -0.6228 
 (-1.20) (-0.43) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-0.79) (0.02) (-1.54) 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Restate Restate_Irr Restate_NonIrr Restate_BL Restate_NonBL Restate_Negret Restate_Posret 
        
M&A 0.8773*** 0.3459 1.0397*** 1.0969*** 0.7501* 1.1890*** 0.4754 
 (3.07) (0.40) (3.32) (3.04) (1.84) (3.67) (0.96) 
Religion -1.1655 2.7302 -2.5860* 1.1000 -2.9496 -1.1417 -1.6243 
 (-0.86) (0.92) (-1.70) (0.56) (-1.53) (-0.60) (-0.91) 
New_Auditor 0.8815* 1.8354 1.0876** -0.2609 1.7820*** 0.7169 1.2660* 
 (1.72) (1.52) (2.22) (-0.33) (2.81) (1.03) (1.69) 
Auditor_Tenure 0.0015 -0.0208 0.0060 0.0034 0.0058 0.0089 -0.0015 
 (0.25) (-1.25) (0.90) (0.32) (1.01) (1.18) (-0.18) 
Audit_Fee -0.0872 -0.0307 -0.0068 -0.3729 0.2604 -0.2785 0.0513 
 (-0.37) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-1.14) (0.87) (-0.89) (0.15) 
Nonaudit_Fee 0.1033 0.0725 0.0950 0.2133* 0.0189 0.1067 0.1013 
 (1.27) (0.42) (1.08) (1.74) (0.18) (1.03) (0.85) 
Inst_Per -0.0448 -0.1259 0.0937 -0.2784 0.4121 0.2906 -0.1704 
 (-0.12) (-0.19) (0.19) (-0.51) (0.76) (0.58) (-0.31) 
CEO_Chair 0.1048 1.0611** -0.1070 0.0196 0.1771 0.0933 0.2177 
 (0.44) (2.10) (-0.42) (0.05) (0.59) (0.27) (0.77) 
Indep_Per 0.1864 -0.4311 0.1822 1.2261 -0.9394 -0.6527 0.6863 
 (0.17) (-0.20) (0.15) (0.77) (-0.66) (-0.40) (0.47) 
AuditComm_Tenure -0.0496 -0.4475 -0.0285 -0.0156 -0.0836 -0.0819 -0.0759 
 (-0.45) (-1.58) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.46) 
Geoseg -0.0279 -0.0101 -0.0350 -0.1612** 0.0268 -0.0327 -0.0093 
 (-0.81) (-0.16) (-0.99) (-2.43) (0.93) (-0.74) (-0.22) 
Sic2seg 0.2470*** 0.2566* 0.2095** 0.3281** 0.1753* 0.2630** 0.2367** 
 (2.65) (1.68) (2.18) (2.41) (1.70) (2.02) (2.02) 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations  2,434 1,384 2,293 2,101 2,161 2,223 2,027 
Pseudo R-Square 0.160 0.370 0.192 0.256 0.176 0.245 0.171 
Notes: 
Table 6 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT characteristics. Column (1) reports the results for Restate, which includes 
all restatements. Column (2) reports the results for reporting irregularities (Restate_Irr), which include restatements that are identified as fraud or result in SEC or 
Board Investigation or Class action lawsuits. Column (3) reports the results for reporting errors (Restate_NonIrr), which include restatements that are not 
reporting irregularities. Column (4) reports the results for Restate_BL, which refers to restatements resulting in changes in the reported net income or 
shareholders’ equity. Column (5) reports the results for Restate_NonBL, which refers to restatements that do not result in changes in the reported net income or 
shareholders’ equity. Column (6) provides results for Restate_Negret, which includes restatements with negative announcement stock returns. Column (7) 
provides results for Restate_Posret, which includes restatements with positive announcement stock returns. All the models include year and industry fixed effects. 
The numbers in parentheses represent robust z-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 7 Board Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Indep_Per 
<Median 
Indep_Per 
>Median 
AuditComm_Ten 
<Median 
AuditComm_Ten 
>Median 
     
Team_Homo10 2.4207*** 1.3462*** 1.5695*** 1.6928*** 
 (4.05) (2.65) (3.42) (3.23) 
Team_SharedExp10 1.9409*** 0.3375 0.6859 1.3131*** 
 (3.68) (0.74) (1.58) (2.71) 
Team_Size 0.0215 -0.0275 -0.0492 0.0201 
 (0.40) (-0.75) (-1.14) (0.47) 
New_CEO -0.1254 0.4780* 0.3126 0.4584 
 (-0.38) (1.75) (1.15) (1.47) 
New_CFO 0.7210** 0.2063 0.9330*** -0.1420 
 (2.12) (0.61) (3.03) (-0.40) 
CEO_Tenure 0.0034 -0.0007 0.0019 -0.0215 
 (0.11) (-0.02) (0.06) (-0.67) 
CFO_Tenure -0.0372 -0.0131 0.0617 -0.0932** 
 (-0.90) (-0.25) (1.47) (-2.05) 
CEO_Age -0.0392 -0.0164 -0.0125 -0.0066 
 (-1.49) (-0.56) (-0.51) (-0.23) 
CFO_Age -0.0371 0.0194 -0.0004 -0.0113 
 (-1.17) (0.63) (-0.01) (-0.34) 
CEO_Female -0.9044 0.2519 0.2502 -0.1572 
 (-0.89) (0.44) (0.37) (-0.15) 
CFO_Female -2.9321* -0.9125** -1.7843*** -1.0196* 
 (-1.93) (-2.42) (-2.73) (-1.73) 
CEO_Incentive -0.1581 0.3155 -0.3125 0.7029 
 (-0.20) (0.37) (-0.44) (0.82) 
CFO_Incentive 2.3312 -0.7124 0.4931 0.6311 
 (1.53) (-0.52) (0.37) (0.39) 
Size -0.0435 -0.0504 0.0445 -0.2920 
 (-0.14) (-0.24) (0.21) (-1.16) 
BTM 2.0991*** 0.7417 1.3823** 0.7105 
 (2.98) (1.13) (2.24) (0.87) 
Leverage -0.6848 1.4710 0.4596 -0.1677 
 (-0.59) (1.27) (0.45) (-0.16) 
ROA -0.5585 -3.2446** -1.2932 -1.5787 
 (-0.34) (-2.10) (-0.77) (-0.92) 
Std_Ret 8.1935* -1.4738 0.5984 3.2802 
 (1.90) (-0.37) (0.16) (0.84) 
Firm_Age -0.0043 -0.0126 -0.0047 -0.0110 
 (-0.42) (-1.33) (-0.45) (-1.06) 
Ext_Finance 0.3420 -0.6730** 0.0629 -0.6723 
 (0.97) (-2.33) (0.24) (-1.61) 
M&A 0.6108 0.9436** 0.5601 1.3548*** 
 (1.39) (2.20) (1.29) (3.25) 
Religion -0.4348 -1.2024 -0.9107 -1.0023 
 (-0.20) (-0.75) (-0.52) (-0.55) 
New_Auditor 0.4493 1.1981 0.1987 2.0329*** 
 (0.57) (1.59) (0.33) (2.58) 
Auditor_Tenure 0.0075 -0.0013 -0.0027 0.0043 
 (0.94) (-0.17) (-0.35) (0.61) 
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Table 7 Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Indep_Per 
<Median 
Indep_Per 
>Median 
AuditComm_Ten 
<Median 
AuditComm_Ten 
>Median 
     
Audit_Fee -0.0227 -0.0186 -0.0880 0.1744 
 (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.31) (0.52) 
Nonaudit_Fee 0.0396 0.1968 0.0844 0.0534 
 (0.41) (1.57) (0.69) (0.47) 
Inst_Per 0.1896 -0.0964 0.1588 -0.5888 
 (0.33) (-0.19) (0.35) (-1.07) 
CEO_Chair 0.1974 -0.0044 -0.0369 0.2937 
 (0.53) (-0.02) (-0.14) (0.90) 
Geoseg -0.0913 -0.0161 0.0078 -0.0845 
 (-1.41) (-0.48) (0.17) (-1.63) 
Sic2seg 0.3393*** 0.1928* 0.1624 0.3502*** 
 (2.93) (1.67) (1.40) (3.16) 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations  2,434 2,434 
Pseudo R-Square 0.192 0.182 
Difference in 
Team_Homo10 
1.0745* 
[0.0744] 
-0.1233 
[0.4186] 
Difference in  
Team_SharedExp10 
1.6034** 
[0.0110] 
-0.6272* 
[0.0945] 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Table 7 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT characteristics for 
different subsamples partitioned by board characteristics. Column (1) and (2) report the results for the two 
subsamples partitioned by the median value of independent director percentage. Column (3) and (4) report 
the results for the two subsamples partitioned by the median value of average audit committee tenure. All 
the models include year and industry fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses represent robust z-statistics 
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. The numbers in brackets represent p-values. See 
Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 8 Top Managers with Different Positions  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TMT TMT_Fin TMT_NonFin TMT_Top TMT_Subordinate 
      
Team_Homo10 1.6575*** 0.9047*** 0.9683*** 0.6780*** 0.9787*** 
 (4.35) (3.66) (3.30) (2.83) (3.41) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.9457*** 0.8289*** 0.3424 0.5812* 0.5041** 
 (2.77) (2.94) (1.45) (1.88) (2.11) 
      
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations  2,434 2,434 2,263 2,434 2,384 
Pseudo R-Square 0.160 0.146 0.155 0.141 0.148 
 
Notes: 
Table 8 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT characteristics for 
different members of the TMT. Column (1) reports the results for the entire top management team. Column 
(2) reports the results for the top managers who are seemingly more closely related to the financial 
reporting process including CEO, CFO, Chairman, President, Controller, Treasurer, VP-Tax, VP-Internal 
Audit, General Counsel, and VP-Investor Relations. Column (3) reports the results for all the managers 
except the ones included in Column (2). Column (4) reports the results for the top tier executives that 
include the Chairman, CEO, President, and CFO. Column (5) reports the results for the entire top 
management team except for the top tier executives included in Column (4). All the models include year 
and industry fixed effects. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 6. The numbers in 
parentheses represent robust z-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix 
for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 Endogenous Hiring Decisions and CEO Power 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Restate Restate Restate 
    
Team_Homo10 1.8420*** 1.7598*** 1.6147*** 
 (4.17) (3.80) (3.11) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.9653** 1.2414*** 0.8414* 
 (2.34) (2.98) (1.73) 
CEO_Hire50Per 0.4402   
 (0.77)   
Team_Homo10× CEO_Hire50Per -0.6204   
 (-0.95)   
Team_SharedExp10× CEO_Hire50Per 0.2273   
 (0.38)   
CEO_Payslice  0.4196  
  (0.92)  
Team_Homo10× CEO_Payslice  -0.2176  
  (-0.42)  
Team_SharedExp10× CEO_Payslice  -0.6676  
  (-1.35)  
CEO_Chair   -0.0326 
   (-0.06) 
Team_Homo10× CEO_Chair   0.0730 
   (0.12) 
Team_SharedExp10× CEO_Chair   0.1896 
   (0.31) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations  2,434 2,424 2,434 
Pseudo R-Square 0.161 0.161 0.160 
 
Notes: 
Table 9 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT characteristics and 
interaction terms of TMT characteristics and variables measuring CEO power. CEO_Hire50Per is an 
indicator variable which equals to one if more than half of the top managers become Vice President of 
above after the current CEO takes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_Payslice is an indicator variable which 
equals to one if the CEO’s compensation as a percentage of the total compensation of the five highest paid 
employees is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. CEO_Chair is an indicator variable which 
equals to one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. All the models include year 
and industry fixed effects. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 6. The numbers in 
parentheses represent robust z-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix 
for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 10 Separate Analyses of Homogeneity Attributes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Restate Restate Restate Restate Restate Restate 
       
Educ_Homo10  0.8947***   0.9218***   
 (3.84)   (3.88)   
Function_Homo10  0.5289**  0.4697*   
  (2.22)  (1.91)   
Tenure_Homo10   0.9052*** 0.9815***   
   (3.31) (3.62)   
Gender_Homo10     0.2370  
     (1.02)  
Age_Homo10      0.2695 
      (1.15) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.5996** 0.5946** 0.9354*** 0.8702*** 0.6279** 0.6356** 
 (2.31) (2.30) (3.45) (3.21) (2.43) (2.46) 
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 
Pseudo R-Square 0.147 0.141 0.145 0.156 0.139 0.140 
 
Notes: 
Table 10 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on shared TMT experiences 
(Team_SharedExp10) and TMT homogeneity in education (Educ_Homo10), functional background 
(Function_Homo10), firm tenure (Tenure_Homo10), gender (Gender_Homo10), and age (Age_Homo10). 
All models include year and industry fixed effects. Control variables are the same as those included in 
Table 6. The numbers in parentheses represent robust z-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered 
by firm. See Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
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Table 11 Faultline Strength 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Restate Restate Restate 
    
Team_Homo10  1.6267*** 1.7090*** 1.6902*** 
 (4.26) (4.44) (4.50) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.9097*** 1.0019*** 0.9235*** 
 (2.67) (2.88) (2.68) 
Team_FLS_All10 0.2908   
 (1.02)   
Team_FLS_Job10  -0.4656  
  (-1.52)  
Team_FLS_NonJob10   0.4728* 
   (1.82) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 2,434 2,434 2,434 
Pseudo R-Square 0.161 0.162 0.162 
 
Notes: 
Table 11 presents estimation results for the logistic regression of restatements on TMT faultline strength. 
Faultline strength is measured following the procedures described in Shaw (2004). Column (1) reports the 
results when faultline strength is measured using five characteristics including education level, functional 
background, firm tenure, gender, and age. Column (2) shows the results when faultline strength is measured 
using three job related characteristics including education level, functional background, and firm tenure. 
Column (3) shows the results when faultline strength is measured using the two non-job related 
characteristics including gender and age. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Control 
variables are the same as those included in Table 6. The numbers in parentheses represent robust z-statistics 
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 Earnings Management and Top Management Team Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AEM REM_PROD REM_DISX 
    
Constant 0.0584 -0.1403 -0.2790 
 (0.93) (-0.80) (-1.32) 
Team_Homo10 0.0147* 0.0817*** 0.0820*** 
 (1.77) (3.55) (2.70) 
Team_SharedExp10 0.0189** 0.1128*** 0.0675** 
 (2.05) (4.61) (2.33) 
Team_Size 0.0002 0.0032 -0.0011 
 (0.31) (1.47) (-0.44) 
New_CEO 0.0018 -0.0243 -0.0159 
 (0.27) (-1.17) (-0.62) 
New_CFO 0.0159** -0.0090 0.0081 
 (2.48) (-0.47) (0.35) 
CEO_Tenure -0.0005 0.0008 0.0015 
 (-0.64) (0.44) (0.70) 
CFO_Tenure 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0009 
 (0.13) (-0.32) (0.32) 
CEO_Age 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0006 
 (0.31) (-0.00) (0.39) 
CFO_Age -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0010 
 (-1.04) (-0.87) (-0.59) 
CEO_Female 0.0072 0.0081 -0.0051 
 (0.77) (0.24) (-0.12) 
CFO_Female -0.0181* -0.0054 0.0203 
 (-1.75) (-0.19) (0.54) 
CEO_Incentive -0.0258 -0.0622 -0.0509 
 (-1.60) (-1.34) (-0.93) 
CFO_Incentive 0.0226 -0.0362 -0.0933 
 (0.92) (-0.43) (-0.91) 
Size -0.0028 -0.0074 0.0172 
 (-0.79) (-0.67) (1.28) 
BTM 0.0496*** 0.1556*** 0.2595*** 
 (3.39) (3.84) (4.86) 
Leverage 0.0330* -0.0143 0.1118* 
 (1.83) (-0.28) (1.68) 
ROA 0.1186** -0.5160*** 0.1449 
 (1.98) (-3.68) (0.78) 
Std_Ret -0.0149 0.0055 -0.8863*** 
 (-0.18) (0.02) (-2.88) 
Firm_Age 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0011** 
 (1.33) (-0.14) (-2.39) 
Ext_Finance 0.0036 0.0139 -0.0322 
 (0.43) (0.71) (-1.43) 
M&A -0.0181 0.0081 0.0308 
 (-1.23) (0.22) (0.69) 
Religion 0.0458 -0.0051 0.1293 
 (1.65) (-0.07) (1.41) 
New_Auditor 0.0530*** 0.1340*** 0.1249*** 
 (3.59) (2.74) (3.32) 
Auditor_Tenure 0.0004*** 0.0005 0.0005 
 (3.19) (1.61) (1.20) 
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Table 12 Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AEM REM_PROD REM_DISX 
    
Audit_Fee -0.0111** -0.0173 -0.0233 
 (-2.33) (-1.12) (-1.25) 
Nonaudit_Fee 0.0024 0.0146** 0.0082 
 (1.18) (2.28) (1.10) 
Inst_Per -0.0085 -0.0292 -0.0422 
 (-0.91) (-1.27) (-1.57) 
CEO_Chair -0.0041 -0.0205 -0.0017 
 (-0.68) (-1.30) (-0.08) 
Indep_Per 0.0233 0.2404*** 0.3038*** 
 (0.73) (2.87) (2.84) 
AuditComm_Tenure -0.0030 0.0036 0.0126 
 (-1.21) (0.55) (1.59) 
Geoseg -0.0006 -0.0053* 0.0017 
 (-0.67) (-1.83) (0.54) 
Sic2seg 0.0018 0.0245*** 0.0262*** 
 (0.89) (4.38) (3.79) 
    
Observations  410 410 410 
R-Square 0.2229 0.3293 0.2447 
 
 
Notes: 
Table 12 presents estimation results for the OLS regression of accrual or real earnings management on 
TMT characteristics when the firm faces income-increasing earnings management incentives. Income-
increasing earnings management incentives are identified by firms with earnings just meeting or beating the 
analyst consensus forecast, management forecast, performance in the last year, or the zero benchmark. 
Abnormal accruals are estimated using performance matched Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). Real 
earnings management from overproduction (RM_PROD) or from cutting discretionary expenditures 
(RM_DISX) is estimated following Roychowdhury (2006). The numbers in parentheses represent robust t-
statistics. See Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance (two-tailed) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
